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Abstract
SRAM-based FPGAs are highly attractive for space applications due to their in-
flight reconfigurability, decreased development time and cost, and increased design
and testing flexibility. The Xilinx Virtex-5QV is the first commercially available
Radiation Hardened By Design (RHBD) SRAM-based FPGA; however, not all of
its internal components are hardened against radiation-induced errors. This thesis
examines and quantifies the additional considerations and techniques designers should
employ with a RHBD SRAM-based FPGA in a space-based processing system to
achieve high operational reliability. Additionally, this work presents the application
of some of these techniques to the embedded avionics design of the REXIS imaging
payload on the OSIRIS-REx asteroid sample return mission.
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Since the late 1990s, reconfigurable, static random-access memory (SRAM) based
field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) have become increasingly attractive to de-
signers of space-based systems due to their on-orbit reconfigurability, low develop-
ment cost, and flexible design flow. FPGAs are well-suited to space-based digital
signal processing tasks, providing the possibility for orders of magnitude increases
in performance over processor-based implementations. Unfortunately, the technology
making SRAM-based FPGAs reconfigurable also leaves them especially vulnerable
to radiation-induced errors in the space environment when compared to traditional
non-reconfigurable FPGA designs for space applications.
The recent advent of radiation-hardened by design (RHBD) SRAM-based FP-
GAs, such as the Xilinx Virtex-5QV, has provided dramatically decreased estimated
radiation-induced error rates. However, not all of the components of the Virtex-5QV
are RHBD, meaning these components are identical to the components used in the
commercial grade Virtex-5 FPGA. Each of the non-RHBD components have specific
radiation-induced error vulnerabilities, and some of these components require addi-
tional design implementations to decrease the frequency of errors while operating in
high radiation environments such as space. These additional design implementations
result in design constraints that would likely not exist in terrestrial design with a
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commercial SRAM-based FPGA. This thesis enumerates and quantifies some of the
additional design techniques and considerations for an embedded system in a high
radiation environment using a RHBD SRAM-based FPGA and assesses the design
impact of these techniques.
1.2 Overview
An FPGA is a configurable integrated circuit containing a regular structure of logic
cells and special function hardware modules. Designers may customize the intercon-
nection of these logic cells and hardware modules to create user logic designs that
perform specific functions, such as demodulation of a radio frequency signal to extract
the information contained in the signal. The large number of logic cells internal to
FPGAs makes massive parallelization of processing possible, ideally suiting FPGAs
to space-based computation tasks, which usually involve high frequency digital signal
processing.
Traditionally, designers of space-based FPGA systems have employed one time
programmable (OTP) FPGAs, which historically have proven less sensitive to radiation-
induced errors than SRAM-based FPGAs. However, designers may program the in-
ternal logic of OTP FPGAs only once, thus limiting the design process flow and
eliminating the possibility of reconfigurability. Designers may program SRAM-based
FPGAs thousands of times, thus creating a more open logic design flow, facilitating
increased hardware testing, and allowing reconfigurability of the design. At the same
time, SRAM-based FPGAs are inherently vulnerable to errors resulting from ionizing
radiation present in the form of charged particles in the space environment. These
vulnerabilities have discouraged their use in many mission critical applications. De-
spite these limitations, commercial grade SRAM-based FPGAs have flown on many
space missions, in both earth orbit [27] [25] [73] and interplanetary missions [75].
Avionics systems flying commercial SRAM-based FPGAs typically employ configu-
ration bitstream management and triple modular redundancy (TMR) techniques to
reduce the radiation-induced error rate.
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Of primary concern to system designers is the vulnerability of the configuration
cells in SRAM-based FPGAs. The configuration cells control the user logic design
implemented on the FPGA, and thus an error in the configuration cells can cause
malfunctions in, and possibly failure of, the logic design. To increase the reliability
of SRAM-based FPGAs in high radiation environments such as space, Xilinx ap-
plied Radiation Hardened By Design (RHBD) techniques to produce the space grade
Virtex-5QV. The design effort focused on hardening the configuration cells against
radiation-induced Single Event Upsets (SEUs), as well as increasing the robustness
of the logic cells to radiation-induced Single Event Transients (SETs). The RHBD
Virtex-5QV is shown in Figure 1-1.
Figure 1-1: Xilinx Virtex-5QV RHBD SRAM-based FPGA [28]
To verify the effectiveness of the RHBD efforts, the Xilinx Radiation Test Con-
sortium (XRTC) has performed substantial radiation testing on the Virtex-5QV to
characterize its response to high energy charged particles. The XRTC brings together
experts from industry, government, and academia with the purpose of characterizing
radiation effects and mitigation techniques for reconfigurable FPGAs [40]. The XRTC
members have performed static and dynamic radiation tests on almost all of the non-
RHBD features and published the results in various journals, at conferences, and in
technical reports. As the XRTC’s ongoing radiation test campaigns of the Virtex-
5QV have shown, the design efforts have been particularly successful in decreasing
the error rate in the configuration and logic cells.
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1.3 Focus
The focus of this work is to enumerate and quantify the cost of the additional design
implementations used to apply fault tolerance to the non-RHBD elements of the
RHBD SRAM-based Virtex-5QV. These techniques are especially applicable to the
use of soft core processors in SRAM-based FPGAs (commercial or RHBD), interest
in which continues to rise [35] [64]. The additional design factors include system clock
frequency effects and user memory storage space, in addition to system design trades
on required external components, interface complexity, power consumption, and cost.
A prime example of an additional design factor is fault mitigation in the block random
access memory (BRAM) hardware units used to store user design data in Xilinx
FPGAs. Since the BRAM units are not RHBD in the Virtex-5QV, the designer may
activate built-in error detect and correct (EDAC) circuitry (which is Single Error
Correct Double Error Detect (SECDED) in the Xilinx implementation) to mitigate
radiation-induced errors. Adding the EDAC circuitry to the BRAM modules in the
FPGA fabric results in timing constraints on the speed at which the clock network
can operate, as well as power and area increases in the user design. Designers must
be cognizant of the effects and limitations of additional fault tolerance and factor the
implications into system design with the RHBD SRAM-based Virtex-5QV.
The additional design techniques for RHBD SRAM-based FPGAs identified in
this thesis have been applied as fundamental avionics design elements for the the RE-
golith X-ray Imaging Spectrometer (REXIS), which is a student payload on NASA’s
Origins Spectral Interpretation Resource Identification Security Regolith Explorer
(OSIRIS-REx) asteroid sample return mission. The REXIS avionics system is based
on a MicroBlaze softcore processor running on a Virtex-5QV along with supporting
external power, memory, and interface circuitry. The REXIS flight avionics system
serves as a prime case study of how applying additional fault tolerance techniques to
an SRAM-based RHBD FPGA system affects a real world system.
Although the Virtex-5QV is International Traffic in Arms Regulations-controlled
(ITAR-controlled), Xilinx planned to provide designers the option of using the com-
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mercial grade Virtex-5FX130T as a development platform for the space grade Virtex-
5QV. This scheme allows designers to prototype logic designs and printed circuit
board (PCB) configuration and layouts with the commercial Virtex-5FX130T, thus
reducing cost and removing ITAR restrictions from initial design work. All estimates
of FPGA logic utilization and power consumption in this work were performed on
either the commercial grade Virtex-5FX70T FPGA on the Xilinx ML507 develop-
ment board or the commercial grade Virtex-5FX130T FPGA on the Xilinx ML510
development board using Xilinx software designed for the commercial Virtex-5 FPGA
family. No ITAR-controlled software was used to produce results for this work, and
all research data presented is publicly available.
1.4 Thesis Overview
This thesis begins with a literature review of the deleterious effects of radiation on
SRAM-based FPGAs, FPGA radiation testing and effects prediction, and the Virtex-
5QV FPGA in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 follows the literature review with the identifica-
tion and analysis of the additional design techniques for FPGA systems implemented
on RHBD SRAM-based FPGAs . In Chapter 4, the design techniques are applied
to the REXIS avionics system to demonstrate their impact on a real world satellite
payload system. This work concludes with further research possibilities of the addi-
tional RHBD SRAM-based FPGA design techniques and future testing of the REXIS




Radition Effects on FPGAs, FPGA
Radiation Testing, and the RHBD
Virtex-5QV
This chapter provides a brief background on the effects of total ionizing dose (TID)
and single event effects (SEE) on electronics and then details particular radiation
effects on FPGAs, specifically SRAM-based FPGAs, including single event functional
interrupt (SEFI) types and multi-bit upsets (MBUs). Traditional methods of FPGA
SEU testing are presented, along with estimation techniques for on-orbit single event
upset (SEU) error rates. The chapter closes with an overview of the Xilinx RHBD
SRAM-based Virtex-5QV FPGA and radiation testing of the Virtex-5QV.
2.1 Radiation Effects on Electronics
Radiation effects on electronics generally are classified into two types: total dose
effects, typically known as total ionizing dose (TID), and single event effects (SEE).
TID describes the cumulative effects of charged particles on the doping levels of
substrate materials within electronics, specifically silicon. SEE refer to altered circuit
functionality as a result of a single charged particle interacting with the internal
material of an electronic component. The contributions of this work focus primarily
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on additional design techniques to mitigate errors resulting from SEE in SRAM-based
FPGAs.
2.1.1 Total Ionizing Dose
Total ionizing does (TID) in electronics is a cumulative, long-term degradation mecha-
nism due to mainly protons and electrons depositing charge in electronic components,
while a smaller contribution occurs from secondary particles arising from interactions
between the primary particles and spacecraft electronics [76]. As a result of the slow
accumulation of charge in transistor’s oxide regions (Figure 2-1), TID causes thresh-
old shifts in transistor gate voltage, increased transistor leakage current, and timing
skews [65]. Initially, TID effects appear as parametric degradation of the device and
ultimately results in functional failure.
Figure 2-1: Radiation-induced charging of gate oxide in n-channel MOSFET: (a)
normal operation (b) post-irradiation [69]
TID is specified in units of rad, where a rad is defined as radiation absorbed dose.
A rad is the measure of the amount of energy deposited in the material and is equal to
100 ergs (6.24E4 eV or 10 nJ) of energy deposited per gram of material. The energy
deposited in a device must be specified for the material of interest. Thus, for a metal
oxide semiconductor (MOS) transistor, total dose is measured in units of rad(Si) or
rad(SiO2). Ability to withstand TID in Radiation Hardened (RadHard) components
is also specified in units of rads, or more typically in krads. [53]
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Mitigating TID effects is typically accomplished using radiation hardened by pro-
cess (RHBP) techniques and/or shielding. RHBP techniques involve modifying the
standard wafer fabrication process and include inserting an oxide layer in the tran-
sistor substrate, thinning MOS transistor gate oxides, and growing an epitaxial layer
under regions of high doping density [65]. Placing shielding material (such as alu-
minum) around sensitive electronics can reduce TID by absorbing most electrons
and lower energy protons. As shielding is increased, however, shielding effectiveness
decreases because of the difficulty in slowing down higher energy protons [76].
2.1.2 Single Event Effects
Single event effects (SEE) are the electrical disturbances caused by an energetic
charged particle’s ionization of a silicon lattice in an electronic device [26]. The
passage of a single charged particle through a device or a sensitive region of a mi-
crocircuit can induce SEE. Figure 2-2 shows a representation of a charged particle
depositing charge as it passes through the physical structure of a transistor.
Figure 2-2: Charge deposition by charged particle into the substrate of a transistor
[26]
In order for a charge particle (heavy ion or proton) to affect the operation of a
circuit, it must transfer sufficient charge to a transistor gate such that the transistor’s
output state changes. The minimum amount of charge required is usually referred to
as Qcrit, as shown below in
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Qcrit = Cnode × Vnode (2.1)
where Cnode is the capacitance between transistor nodes and Vnode is the transistor
operating voltage. Thus as transistor process sizes shrink (resulting in decreased
capacitance) and transistor operational voltage decreases, Qcrit decreases [65], and
the charged particle energy necessary for upset is also decreased. In a latching circuit
with memory elements, a single event effect can cause the wrong value to be stored
and thus produce an error lasting until the value in memory is corrected/modified,
while a single event effect in a combinatorial circuit can create a transient error in a
current operation. These errors can propagate through the device’s logic stream and
lead to errors such as a pin outputting an incorrect value or a circuit element latching
incorrect data [65]. SEE can manifest in several forms:
Single Event Upset (SEU)
Single events upsets occur when a single charged particle causes one or more
memory cells or configuration cell within the device to change state. If only a
single memory or configuration cell changes state, the SEU is referred to as a
single bit upset (SBU). If multiple memory or configuration cells change state,
the SEU is called a multi-bit upset (MBU).
Single Event Transient
A single event transient (SET) occurs when a single charged particle causes a
temporary voltage/current spike. If the pulse width of this spike is sufficiently
large, and occurs at the right time, it can be latched in a flip-flop and propagate
through the circuit [80]. The probability of an error being latched increases with
increasing clock frequency [36].
Single Event Latchup
Single event latchup (SEL) is the high current state of a bi-stable parasitic four-
layer PNPN structure inherent in complimentary metal oxide semiconductor
(CMOS) where a short circuit sustains itself through positive feedback. It may
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be triggered by single-event charge deposition or electrical noise, but the only
way to remove latchup is to cycle power. [83] Traditionally in radiation testing,
any sudden high current mode that requires a power cycle of the component to
recover functionality and nominal current qualifies as a latchup. [83] Depending
on the duration and amplitude of the high current condition, a SEL may cause
permanent damage to a device [65]. Vertical thyristors in CMOS technology
cause SEL. [47].
Single Event Functional Interrupt
A single event functional interrupt (SEFI) is an upset of an internal memory
element or a circuit which causes a loss in the device’s functionality[65]. Tradi-
tionally, to recover an FPGA-based system from a device SEFI, the FPGA must
be re-configured via pulsing the PROG pin or cycling power, which involves a
minimum outage of some tens or hundreds of milliseconds [83].
Single Event Gate Rupture
Single event gate ruptures (SEGR) primarily affect metal oxide semiconductor
field effect transistors (MOSFETs) when operating in the OFF condition (no
current is flowing between drain to source). However, MOSFETs in the ON
state still are susceptible to over current conditions caused by charged particle
interaction.
Heavy ions (galactic cosmic rays and solar heavy ions) usually cause single event
effects by direct deposit of charge. This effect is measured by the ion’s linear energy
transfer (LET), which is the energy lost by the ion per unit length in the material
of interest normalized by the particular material’s density [76]. LET has units of
MeV-mg/cm2. Not every heavy ion strike will deposit enough charge to upset a
node, given that different paths through a region surrounding a sensitive node will
require different amounts of time to pass through the region, which results in different
amounts of charge deposited in the sensitive region.
The region surrounding a sensitive node in an electronic device from which charge
from an ion strike is collected is known as the sensitive volume (sometimes referred to
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Figure 2-3: Different chord lengths of charge particles passing through sensitive region
of an electronic device [36]
as the collection volume). The critical charge (Qcrit) is the amount of charge that must
collect in the sensitive volume to cause an upset in the device. To correlate the SEU
rate with the direction dependencies of a given device, the sensitive volume is often
taken to be a rectangular parallel piped (RPP), a 3D volume roughly corresponding
to the depletion region of a pn-junction. However, this approach only is useful as
a mathematical or conceptual model and must not be interpreted as an accurate
physical model. An ion’s entry angle into the sensitive volume will determine the
length of the path, or chord length, for that ion through the sensitive volume, as
shown in Figure 2-3. Some particle chord lengths will be long enough for a particular
ion to deposit Qcrit required for an upset, and others will deposit a smaller amount
of charge that, although collected, will not cause an upset condition. [36]
Protons can also induce SEE in electronics. Typically, protons do not generate
sufficient ionization to produce the charge necessary for SEE. Instead, protons cause
SEE via nuclear interactions with secondary particles (spallation and fractionation
products) [36]. Proton energy (more so than LET) is significant in the production of
secondary particles that can cause SEE, therefore device sensitivity to these particles
usually is expressed as a function of incident proton energy [76]. If a proton strike
causes nuclear reaction within a sensitive region of a node, an upset will occur [36].
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2.2 Radiation Effects on FPGAs
An FPGA is a configurable integrated circuit based on a high logic density regular
structure, made up of an array of logic blocks and interconnections customizable by
programmable switches. The user can customize the logic blocks and interconnec-
tions to realize various designs for different applications [21]. Currently, antifuse-
based, SRAM-based, and flash-based technologies are the main methods used to
implement the programmables switches in FPGA devices. Many NASA systems have
used FPGAs that employ antifuse technology, in which permanent connections are
programmed by high-current pulses that change the state of small regions in the
gate array, making circuit connections to implement the user design [21]. Anti-fuse
FPGAs are one time programmable (OTP), meaning the user may program the in-
terconnections between logic blocks only once. Actel and Aeroflex are the primary
manufacturers of antifuse FPGAs.
In SRAM FPGAs, the programmable switch is usually a pass transistor or multi-
plexer controlled by the state of a Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) bit [21].
Thus, SRAM-based FPGAs are reconfigurable, allowing users to reprogram them
thousands of times. Antifuse technology has several inherent limitations that make
SRAM-based FPGAs more attractive. First, once an antifuse device is programmed,
it cannot be changed; additional devices have to be programmed and physically re-
place the installed devices. Second, available antifuse gate arrays are considerably
smaller in gate count than SRAM configurable gate arrays. [21] However, SRAM-
based FPGAs customizations are volatile, resulting in the FPGA losing its configura-
tion when the device is powered off. Thus, SRAM-based FPGAs must be programmed
with the desired interconnections each time they are powered on. Atmel and Xilinx
are the primary manufacturers of SRAM-based FPGAs for space applications.
Flash-based FPGAs, in which the programmable switch is a floating gate transis-
tor that can be turned off by injecting charge onto the floating gate [21], are also a
design option for space-based systems. Although flash-based switches are non-volatile
and will survive power cycling, TID is a problem for Flash-based technology [47].
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Table 2.1: TID rating and SEL immunity for various space grade FPGAs





Aeroflex UT6325 Eclipse[17] Antifuse 300 120
Microsemi RT3PE600L[16] Flash 25 - 55 96.5
Microsemi RTAX-S[4] Antifuse 200 - 300 117
Xilinx XQR4V[9] SRAM 300 125
Xilinx XQR5VFX130[95] SRAM 1000 125
Flash-based memories require a charge pump to facilitate writing and erasing, and
charged particle interaction degrades the charge pumps [85]. Radiation testing also
has shown NAND-based architectures to be inherently more sensitive to TID damage
than NOR-based architectures [85]. Actel is the primary manufacturer of Flash-based
FPGAs, such as the RT3P series [16]. Table 2.1 lists the advertised TID and SEL
ratings of several space-grade FPGAs.
Traditionally, Altera reconfigurable FPGAs have not been considered for space
applications due to their tendency to latchup in radiation testing with low LET (cite
Single Event Effects Test Results for Advanced Field Programmable Gate Arrays,
2006) [22]. However, recent testing of the Altera Stratix-IV indicated that the de-
vice was latchup immune up to an effective LET of 145.5 MeV-cm2/mg [42]. Thus
Altera devices may be suited for space applications, pending further SEL, static, and
dynamic testing in conjunction with fault tolerance mitigation characterization.
2.2.1 Xilinx SRAM-based FPGAs
This thesis focuses on fault mitigation strategies and techniques in SRAM-based FP-
GAs, specifically Xilinx FPGAs. Xilinx FPGAs consist of an array of configurable
logic blocks (CLBs) surrounded by programmable input/output blocks (IOBs), all in-
terconnected by an array of routing switches (general routing matrix (GRM)) located
at the intersections of horizontal and vertical routing channels. Each CLB has a set
of look-up tables (LUT), multiplexers, and flip-flops, which are divided into slices. A
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LUT is a logic structure able to implement a Boolean function as a truth table. The
CLBs provide the functional elements for constructing logic while the IOBs provide
the interface between the package pins and the CLBs. The FPGA matrix also has
dedicated memory blocks called BRAMs, clock delay-locked loops (DLLs) for clock
distribution delay compensation, clock domain control phase lock loops (PLL) for
frequency multiplication and clock network de-skew, and other components that vary
according to the FPGA family. Figure 2-4 shows a generic representation of the Xilinx
FPGA architecture. [21]
Figure 2-4: Xilinx SRAM-based FPGA Architecture [21]
2.2.2 SEE in SRAM-based FPGAs
In an SRAM-based FPGA, configuration memory cells control the routing and logic
of a user design on the device. Thus, upsetting an SRAM cell in the configuration
memory can change the behavior of the user design until proper value is restored to
the SRAM cell [80]. Figure 2-5a the correct operation of a user design a routing, LUT,
and flip flop configuration intended to implement a logical AND with the series of 1’s
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and 0’s representing the individual configuration cells that control the function of the
routing and logic elements. Figure 2-5b then illustrates how SEU-induced changes
(sometimes known as bit flips) to values stored in the configuration memory cells
could cause an unintended signal rerouting and change in the logical function of the
design.
(a) User design operating correctly
(b) Error in user design resulting from SEU-induced configuration cell bit
flip
Figure 2-5: SEU effects in SRAM-based FPGA logic fabric [68]
Unlike most electronic components, in which SEU-induced errors either temporar-
ily change the behavior of a circuit (such as in the case of an SET), or permanently
damage the circuit (in the case of a SEL, SEB, or SEGR), SEU-induced configuration
cell changes in SRAM-based FPGAs can cause errors that take on the characteris-
tics of both transient errors and permanent errors [80]. As a result of this dual set
of radiation effects vulnerabilities, researchers usually distinguish between static and
dynamic radiation effects in SRAM-based FPGAs. Static effects are errors caused
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by radiation-induced upsets to the bit-value stored in any storage element (e.g. con-
figuration cells, user flip-flops, BRAM cells, etc.) [78]. Dynamic effects are upsets
resulting from inadvertent latching of transitory effects (SETs) in the control, clocking
and access circuitry of a storage cell. The unpredictable nature of permanent changes
to user designs has traditionally been a roadblock to the use of SRAM-based FP-
GAs in space systems and has motivated the importance of protecting configuration
memory in SRAM-based FPGA designs for space missions.
It is important to note a static upset a configuration memory cell is not synony-
mous with a functional error because a given configuration cell upset might have no
effect on user design functionality. [29]. In Xilinx FPGAs, approximately one of every
eight configuration bits is a routing bit, and less than 40% of routing bits are in use
in a fully utilized FPGA [26]. Additionally, because less than 20%, and typically less
than 10%, of the configuration cells have any significance to a design implementation,
a high probability exists that any given configuration bit flip will have little or no
effect on the design. For example, the programmable interconnect has many possi-
bilities, but only a few of those possible connections are used in a particular design,
meaning an SEU causing the connection of an unused segment of interconnect to
another unused segment has no effect on a given design [34]. Also, an SEU affecting
device unused hardware resources (such as unused CLBs, I/O, DCMs, BRAMs, etc.)
will not affect the design [33].
2.2.3 Multi-Bit Upsets in SRAM-based FPGAs
Multi-bit upsets (MBUs) can introduce more than one error into a system at any given
time. Thus, MBUs in SRAM-based FPGAs are of significant concern because their
effects break the underlying assumptions for systems using triple modular redundancy
(TMR) fault mitigation techniques, which rely on no more than one error occurring
in the system at any one time.
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Figure 2-6: Distribution of single bit and multi-bit upsets in accelerator testing of
Xilinx Virtex FPGA family [48]
MBUs can manifest as multiple independent errors or span redundant circuit copies
[48]. When an error in two or more redundant copies (domains) of a circuit imple-
mented with TMR causes the voter to select the wrong value, a domain crossing error
(DCE) occurs [74].
As shown in Figure 2-7, radiation testing of Xilinx FPGAs has shown that each
successive Virtex family has been more susceptible to MBUs than previous genera-
tions [48] [74]. Figure 2-6 shows a breakdown of single bit and multi-bit upsets as a
percentage of total upsets observed during testing.
2.2.4 SRAM-Based FPGA SEFI
SEUs that affect the values stored in an SRAM-based FPGA’s control logic elements
can cause a SEFI to occur [43]. When a SEFI occurs in an SRAM-based FPGA, a
complete reconfiguration or power-cycle of the device is required before the design
returns to normal functionality [83]. A list of SEFIs observed in XRTC radiation
testing of the Virtex-5QV follows below [83].
POR SEFI
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Figure 2-7: Percentage of observed radiation-induced errors that were MBUs at var-
ious particle energies for Xilinx Virtex FPGA family [48]
The Power-On-Reset (POR) SEFI results in the loss of all program and state
data and reset of all internal storage cells. This SEFI is evidenced by the
DONE pin dropping low, a sudden drop in the FPGA current consumption to
its pre-configuration value, and the loss of all configuration functions. After a
POR SEFI, attempts to readback the configuration bitstream will result in an
unusually large number of readback errors.
SMAP SEFI
SelectMAP (SMAP) SEFIs result in loss of capability to read or write through
the SelectMAP port of the FPGA. The SelectMAP port provides access to the
the FPGA’s configuration memory for bitstream readback and modification.
The inability to refresh data or the retrieval of only meaningless data over the
SelectMAP interface indicates this SEFI has occurred.
FAR SEFI
The frame address register (FAR) SEFI results in the continuous incrementing
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of the FAR in an uncontrollable fashion. The FAR holds the configuration
frame address for access into the FPGA’s configuration memory. This SEFI is
evidenced by the loss of capability to read and write control values to the FAR
while other aspects of the SelectMAP port remain fully functional.
Global Signal SEFI
The Global Signal SEFI includes assertion of the Global Set/Reset (GSR),
Global Write Enable (GWE), Global Drive High (GHIGH B), and others. A
user design can observe all of these signals via the status register (STAT) or
one of the control registers (CTLx).
Although so-called “scrub SEFIs” were observed in radiation testing of the Virtex-
4QV [43], XRTC testers have not observed them in testing of the Virtex-5QV [83].
SEFI testing usually involves exposing the FPGA to a significantly higher flux of
highly energetic particles than are observed in worst case space environments. SE-
FIs are typically low in occurrence and rarely occur on-orbit1. However, in test
environments where test engineers hugely accelerate event rates to obtain statistical
significance and accurate measurements of upset conditions with negligible event cross
sections, SEFIs may occur [43].
2.2.5 Terrestrial Radiation Effects
Surface-based (terrestrial) upsets are of interest to systems that must be highly re-
liable and highly available despite being very sensitive to radiation. High altitude
military and commercial aircraft systems encounter over 300 times the amount of
neutron radiation than systems operating at sea-level. FPGAs are vulnerable to ra-
diation effects at high altitudes, and are also vulnerable to radiation-induced upsets
on the earth’s surface [72]. Among other considerations, this is due to the scaling (or
shrinking) of the microscopic transistors and other electronic components of devices.
As discussed previously, the smaller the device size, the easier it is for a low energy
particle to cause an error. Thus, as technology continues to improve and shrink,
1See Quinn et. al.[73] for discussion of an observed Virtex-4 SEFI on-orbit
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systems will experience more and more undesirable effects due to radiation on earth
[36].
Table 2.2: Neutron cross section per bit for several Xilinx FPGA families [97]
FPGA Family Configuration Memory Block RAM Error
Virtex-II Pro 2.74 x 10-14 3.91 x 10-14 +/- 10%
Virtex-4 1.55 x 10-14 2.74 x 10-14 +/- 10%
Virtex-5 6.70 x 10-15 3.96 x 10-14 +/- 10%
The Rosetta neutron single event upset (NSEU) test is an ongoing Xilinx effort
to characterize the effects of neutron induced errors from 60,000 feet of altitude down
to sea level [62]. Xilinx has placed test systems at various locations world wide–
an example of such a test system for Virtex-II devices appears in Figure 2-8 and
contains 100 XC2V6000 chips arranged in a ten by ten matrix for a total of nearly
two billion configuration bits under observation. Much of Xilinx’s reliability data for
FPGA functionality and hardware module reliability [97] is based on testing with the
Rosetta modules.
Figure 2-8: Rosetta experiment array of 100 Virtex devices [62]
2.3 FPGA Radiation Effects Prediction and Test-
ing
Modeling radiation effects on a particular FPGA requires physical characterization
of the FPGA and characterization of the planned orbit the FPGA will encounter in
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space. Bombarding the FPGA with ionized particles in a particle accelerator chamber
and monitoring the effects provides physical characterization of the FPGA’s radiation
response, while characterizing the planned orbit typically consists of using established
software tools to obtain estimates of charged particle flux in the planned orbit. Once
researchers and designers accomplish both of these steps, they can then calculate
an estimate for the number of radiation-induced upsets the FPGA will experience
on-orbit [36].
2.3.1 Device Cross Section
As described in this section, static cross section is used to measure the static vulnera-
bility of an FPGA to radiation effects. Researchers determine an FPGA’s static cross
section by observing the number of static upsets induced in the device by a given
fluence of radiation during particle accelerator testing. The static cross section of a
device, σ, is calculated by dividing the number of upsets observed by the fluence of








This static cross section corresponds to the sensitive or SEU vulnerable area of
the device to radiation at a particular energy. To determine an overall static per-bit
cross section, researchers repeat experimental testing at a range of particle energy
levels and fit the resulting data points to a distribution for analysis (the Weibull
distribution is commonly used, as discussed below). In addition, testers repeat ex-
perimental device characterization for both protons and heavy ions, facilitating static
cross section estimates for each type of radiation. [36]
Several complicating factors may arise in determining a device’s static cross sec-
tion, one of which is many particle accelerators are limited in the energy level of
particles they can generate for testing. In these cases, researchers may tilt the de-
vice with respect to the particle accelerator beam to increase the effective LET. As
was discussed previously, providing a longer path through sensitive regions allows
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charged particles more time to deposit charge and thus upset the node (see Figure
2-3). Multiplying the denominator of Equation 2.2 by the cosine of the particle angle
of incidence (theta) accounts for the increase in effective LET and angle of incidence,





#(particls/cm2)× cos(θ) = (cm
2) (2.3)
2.3.2 Weibull Curves
Figure 2-9: Weibull curve for Virtex-4QVSX55 configuration cell upset susceptibilities
to protons [43]
Weibull curves are typically used to represent the vulnerability of an FPGA (and
other microelectronics) to charged particles, via fitting the cross section data ob-
tained during testing. The curves show the per bit cross section vulnerability of a
given device to different charged particle energies. Equation 2.4 gives the Weibull
distribution for protons [36].
σ(energy) = σsat(1− e−[(x−xo)/W ]s) (2.4)
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where σsat is the limiting or plateau cross section of the device in cm
2, x is the proton
energy in MeV , xo is the upset threshold energy in MeV , W is the dimensionless
width parameter, and s is the dimensionless exponent parameter of the Weibull fit.
An example of a proton Weibull curve fit to test results of the Virtex-4QV SX55
FPGA’s static cross section for configuration cells appears in Figure 2-9.
Weibull curves for heavy ion cross sections are calculated slightly differently to
account for the effective LET of the heavy ions. Equation 2.5 gives the heavy ion
Weibull distribution [43].
σ(LET ) = σsat(1− e−[(L−Lthresh)/W ]s) (2.5)
where σsat is the limiting or plateau cross section of the device in cm
2, L is the effective
LET in MeV × cm2/mg, Lthresh is the upset threshold LET in MeV × cm2/mg, W
is the dimensionless width parameter, and s is the dimensionless exponent parameter
of the Weibull fit.
Figure 2-10: Weibull curve for Virtex-4QVSX55 configuration upset susceptibilities
to heavy ions [43]
An example of a heavy ion Weibull curve fit to test result’s of the Virtex-4QV’s
configuration cell static cross section testing results appears in Figure 2-10.
For SRAM-based FPGAs, SEFI device cross sections sometimes appear to be
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on the same scale as the SEU bit cross sections, but in reality when the SEU cross
sections are scaled to device cross sections, the SEU cross sections are several orders of
magnitude larger than the SEFI device cross sections. While the SEU bit cross-section
is very small, each device has millions of configuration bits. The SEFI device cross
section reflects the accurate reasoning that only 10-1000 bits usually are responsible
for each SEFI state [49].
2.3.3 CREME96
The Naval Research Laboratory first developed the Cosmic Ray Effects on Micro-
Electronics (CREME) modeling and simulation tool in 1981, and CREME has since
become the industry standard for predicting upset rates in electronics due to ionizing
radiation [36].
Figure 2-11: CREME96-generated predictions for various charged particle flux for
interplanetary/geosynchronous orbit during solar minimum
CREME creates numerical models of the near-Earth space radiation environment
and evaluates the expected error rates from radiation effects on the electronic device
given user-supplied device cross section data. CREME can predict upset rates for
a given device from both proton and heavy ion interaction. Seven different solar
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conditions for flux of particles in the near earth radiation environment are available:
solar minimum, solar maximum, solar minimum trapped proton peak, solar maximum
trapped proton peak, worst week, worst day, and worst 5 minute peak. Engle et. al.
provide a concise review of the CREME96 calculation process [36]. Figure 2-11 is an
example CREME output for charged particle flux in interplanetary/geosynchronous
orbit during solar minimum, and Figure 2-12 is an example CREME96 output for
heavy ion LET flux in interplanetary/geosynchronous orbit during solar minimum.
Figure 2-12: CREME96-generated predictions for integral LET spectrum for inter-
planetary/geosynchronous orbit during solar minimum
2.3.4 Upset Rate Prediction
Using estimates of the charged particle flux from software tools like CREME and
measured device sensitivity to radiation effects in the form of device cross sections,
researchers and designers can estimate device error rates for a given orbit. The
calculations are different for proton error rates and heavy ion rates due to the angular
dependence of heavy ion effects. To estimate the expected upset rate due to protons,
one integrates the product of the device proton cross section and the flux of protons






where σ(E) is the device proton cross section as a function of energy E and f(E)
is the differential flux of particles with energy >E.
To estimate the error rate due to heavy ions, one essentially multiplies the device
heavy ion cross section for each LET value with the predicted heavy ion flux at the
LET value and then integrates over the entire LET spectrum of interest. However,
as mentioned previously, only ions of a particular LET with sufficient chord length
to deposit Qcrit will cause an upset. Thus a term to account for the percentage of
particles P at a specific LET α that will deposit at least Qcrit is introduced into the




σ(α)P (α)F (α)dα. (2.7)
where α is the LET in MeV-mg/cm2, σ(α) is the heavy ion cross section as a
function of α, P (α) is the differential of path lengths in the sensitive volume that can
deposit Qcrit with a LET of α, F (α) is the integral flux of heavy ions with LET >α.
2.3.5 Fault Injection
Fault injection involves inserting faults into particular targets in a device at a de-
termined time in the operating process and monitoring the results to determine the
design’s fault response behavior [63]. In SRAM-based FPGAs, fault injection takes
the form of intentionally corrupting configuration bits in the device and observing
the effects on the user design [37]. Due to its high flexibility in terms of spatial and
temporal information, fault injection is an attractive technique for the evaluation
of design characteristics such as reliability, safety, and fault coverage. Additionally,
it also offers reduced turnaround time and evaluation cost compared to traditional
radiation ground testing with particle accelerators, aiding designers in developing
SEU-hardened systems [63].
Radiation testing with a particle accelerator is used in many cases to validate fault
51
injection analyses and results [80] [63] [57]. The limitations of fault injection methods
include inability to alter the state of flip flops in the FPGA [57] and inability to simu-
late errors in the logic that controls the configuration process (bitstream loading) [31].
If possible, a combined characterization strategy including both particle accelerator
testing and fault injection testing provides a comprehensive set of fault modes and
error conditions, which designers may use to develop higher fidelity radiation effects
models.
2.4 Traditional Mitigation Techniques
A large amount of research and testing has identified techniques for mitigating the
effects of radiation-induced upsets in electronics, specifically in FPGA designs [49]
[47]. Configuration scrubbing, Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), and error cor-
recting codes (ECC) are among the most popular. Additionally, in an SRAM-based
FPGA design using BRAM to store data (such as the instruction and data memory
of a softcore processor), designers should employ techniques to protect user design
memory.
2.4.1 Configuration Bitstream Scrubbing
Because upsetting an SRAM cell in the configuration memory can change the be-
havior of a user design in an SRAM-based FPGA, constantly monitoring the con-
figuration bitstream to avoid fault accumulation is necessary [21]. The process of
detecting upsets in configuration memory is known as configuration bitstream mon-
itoring, while correcting upsets in configuration memory is known as configuration
bitstream scrubbing. While the user design runs on an SRAM-based FPGA, a scrub-
bing unit continually checks for upsets in the configuration memory. Scrubbing allows
a system to repair bit-flips in the configuration memory without disrupting the user
design operation, including the memory cells controlling the CLB, LUT, and routing
configurations. Configuration scrubbing prevents the build-up of multiple configura-
tion errors and reduces the time in which an invalid circuit configuration is allowed to
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operate within the user design. In Xilinx FPGAs, scrubbing does not refresh the con-
tents of CLB flip-flops, BRAMs, or Dynamic Reconfiguration Ports (DRP), as these
bits are not accessible through bitstream readback [21]. However, the configuration
bits occupy significantly more memory cells in an SRAM-based FPGA than the flip
flops, BRAMs, and DRP bits, as shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Configuration and user memory bit percentages for the Xilinx Virtex-4
FX60 FPGA [80]
Memory Type Bits Percentage of Total
Configuration Bits 20,960,512 81.0%
User BRAM Bits 4,870,144 18.8%
User Flip-Flop Bits 50,560 0.2%
Designers may apply a power cycling scheme as the simplest form of scrubbing
because it causes FPGA reconfiguration, which eliminates any accumulated errors
[26] (assuming the memory device storing the configuration bitstream does not suffer
any radiation-induced upsets). At the very least, an external device is required to
remove power from the FPGA and then reapply power to the FPGA to start configu-
ration with an error-free bitstream. However, a power cycle only scheme provides no
visibility into the nature of the configuration errors and allows errors to persist until
configuration occurs after power-up, both of which are significant drawbacks.
Most mitigation approaches use either a monitoring and scrubbing unit external
to the FPGA or an internal monitor and scrubber implemented on the FPGA with
a combination of custom logic and dedicated hardware modules. If the scrubber is
external, it typically is implemented on a separate RadHard processor, FPGA, ap-
plication specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or programmable logic device (PLD). An
external scrubber also may read the contents of the FPGA configuration bitstream
and compare it for errors against a “golden” (un-irradiated and correct) copy of the
configuration bitstream, which usually is stored in radiation-hardened non-volatile
memory. If the scrubber is internal, it may use hardware modules to calculate Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) values of frames of the configuration bitstream and com-
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pare them to the known CRC values for each frame [80] [33], or rely on Hamming
codes for SECDED error mitigation [31].
For Xilinx FPGAs, external scrubbing usually is performed through the SelectMAP
interface. In an external scrubbing scheme, the configuration controller must be able
to perform three of the four key functionalities listed below, with readback/error
detection optional under specific circumstances [87]:
• FPGA configuration
• SEFI detection and handling
• Active partial reconfiguration (scrubbing)
• Readback/error detection
External “blind” configuration scrubbing typically performs constant rewrites of
configuration memory values whether or not upsets have occurred in the memory cells
[51]. If no upsets have occurred, the scrubber will simply write the same configuration
data into the FPGA that is already present for each pass over the bitstream. If up-
sets have occurred, scrubbing will overwrite the upset configuration bits with correct
values [51]. In the past, this so called ”blind” scrubbing (i.e., without configura-
tion readback) was done more frequently. Through the years, however, the logic and
registers necessary for scrubbing have grown larger and SEUs in these areas during
scrubbing have been observed to cause high current latchup states [49].
Readback scrubbing with correction is a variation of blind scrubbing. In this
mode, an external scrubber reads back the FPGA internal configuration memory and
compares it with a golden bitstream. If the scrubber finds a difference between the
bitstreams, the scrubber overwrites the erroneous configuration frame with the correct
values from the golden bitstream [51]. The external scrubber may calculate a CRC
value for each configuration frame prior to beginning scrubbing, thus allowing rapid
comparison of each frame’s CRC to the corresponding golden frame’s CRC during
scrubbing. Because the device bitstream is not scrubbed top-to-bottom, SEUs in the
configuration circuitry only should have a localized effect [49].
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2.4.2 Triple Modular Redundancy
TMR is the classic and most commonly used error mitigation technique for SRAM-
based FPGAs [79] [49]. TMR provides fault tolerance by triplicating a user design
and instantiating a voter to vote on the outputs of the three modules. If a fault occurs
in one of the triplicated versions of the design, the other two modules will out-vote
the faulty module, ensuring the overall output remains correct. The circuits must
operate in lockstep for the voter to atomically compare their outputs [65]. However,
since the configuration bits controlling logic and routing in an SRAM-based FPGA
are susceptible to SEUs, the voter itself and all routing also must be triplicated to
prevent errors due to a fault in the voter [79]. Implementing TMR in a design can
incur power and area costs of up to 3 times more than what a non-triplicated design
would require [26].
Much of the FPGA design process depends on synthesis tools designed to minimize
the area and maximize the speed of the user design in the FPGA fabric [49]. Despite
a designer’s intentions, synthesis tools may remove some or all of the redundant
circuit modules meant to implement TMR in a circuit in order to optimize a circuit
for performance (speed) and minimal hardware area consumption [47]. This issue
is especially salient when inputs and outputs are single sourced in a design [47]. As
shown in Figure 2-13, the synthesized circuit that will be programmed into the FPGA
is not protected by TMR, and the remaining voters increase the sensitive cross-section
of the design [47]. To combat over-zealous synthesis tools, industry and researchers
have developed specialized synthesis tools, such as the Xilinx TMRTool [14] [47] and
BYU BL-TMR Tool [47] [73], to maintain TMR implementations.
2.4.3 User Memory Protection
Since most designs make use of internal BRAM for data storage, providing fault tol-
erance and reliability techniques to BRAM is of prime importance in FPGA systems.
For softcore processors in particular, upsets in the user memories must be detected
and corrected [80]. Additionally, because BRAM cells switch quickly between states
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Figure 2-13: Example of FPGA synthesis tool removing redundant modules to opti-
mize circuit for speed and area [47]
during operation, they are more susceptible to SEUs than configuration cells, which
remain static during most (if not all) of operation [33]. As noted previously in this
section, configuration bitstream scrubbing does not access the memory bits stored in
BRAM and is therefore not useful for correcting radiation-induced errors in BRAM.
Error correcting codes (ECC) and memory scrubbing are the primary methods of
mitigating errors in user memory.
SECDED Methods
Error correcting codes (ECC), which consist of adding extra bits to a memory ar-
ray to indicate the status of the data stored in the memory array, are traditionally
the method of choice for memory protection. Hamming code, a relatively simple
yet powerful ECC code, provides single error correction and double error detection
(SECDED). It involves transmitting data with multiple check bits (parity bits) and
decoding the associated check bits when receiving data to detect errors. The check
bits are parallel parity bits generated from the logical XORing of certain bits in the
original data word. If bit error(s) are introduced in the codeword, several check bits
show parity errors after decoding the retrieved codeword. The combination of these
check bit errors display the nature of the error, and the position of any single bit
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error is identified from the check bits. [81]
SECDED provided by ECC is an efficient method to correct the effects of an SEU
in a memory word and detect when two errors occur in a memory word. When more
than two errors are present in a memory word, one of three results occur. Either the
erroneous word is an incorrect but valid code word (thus no correction or detection
occurs and the output is incorrect), or a single error is falsely corrected (and the
output is incorrect), or a double error is detected. If a double error is reported when
there are more than two upsets, the upsets will be caught, otherwise SECDED fails.
[79]
SECDED Hamming code implementations in BRAM are available for SRAM-
based FPGAs [81], but since the ECC logic and routing is itself sensitive to upsets,
measures must be taken to prevent faults caused by upsets in either user memory
content, or upsets in the logic and routing protecting the memory [80]. Additionally,
employing SECDED ECC in an SRAM-based FPGA has power and performance
implications, which this work will address.
Memory Scrubbing
Another reliable method to mitigate errors in BRAM is to constantly refresh the
BRAM contents (scrubbing). Since Virtex-5 BRAM modules are dual port memories,
one of the ports could be dedicated to error detection and correction. But this also
means the BRAM is available only as a single port memory to the rest of the user
logic.
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Figure 2-14: BRAM protected by TMR with memory scrubbing [79]
To refresh the memory contents, a counter is used to cycle through the memory
addresses, incrementing the address once every established number of clock cycles.
For each address, voters choose the correct (voted correct) data to write back into
the memory [63].
Fault injection and radiation testing of various protection strategies for BRAM on
Xilinx FPGAs have shown full TMR and memory scrubbing can eliminate essentially
all SEU-induced errors in a BRAM or in the logic and routing leading to a BRAM,
provided at least one redundant BRAM is used for effective scrubbing [80]. Figure
2-14 shows an implementation of triplicated BRAMs with memory scrubbing.
2.4.4 Combined Mitigation Approaches
The possibility of combining various fault mitigation techniques for different mission
requirements and mission environments creates a trade space for system designers.
Figure 2-15 shows the Xilinx overview for SEU-induced error mitigation scheme se-
lection based on the system requirements and radiation environment [26].
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Figure 2-15: Xilinx radiation-induced error mitigation trade space matrix [26]
In the least stringent case, when the SEU rate in the mission environment is low,
the operating window is minimal, and the importance of the FPGA data production is
low, a system with no added mitigation may suffice. However, as SEU rate, operating
window, and data criticality increase, more mitigation techniques should be applied to
the system to increase reliability, including configuration scrubbing and TMR (XTMR
represents application of the Xilinx TMRTool, which appears later in this work). In
the most stringent case in which SEU rate, operating window, and data criticality are
high, redundant FPGAs may be employed to achieve the highest level of reliability.
The matrix in Figure 2-15 does not account for power consumption considera-
tions, area cost, or performance impact of the various options presented. As more
mitigation techniques are added, power consumption will almost certainly increase,
likely by a factor of three for TMR implementation, and possibly by a factor of two
for configuration scrubbing, depending on the scrubber implementation. A designer
must carefully weigh the associated cost of added mitigation techniques to ensure the
mitigated system still meets power, area, and performance requirements.
2.5 Xilinx RHBD XQR5VFX130 FPGA
As the first RHBD SRAM-based FPGA, the Xilinx XQR5VFX130 (Virtex-5QV)
offers radiation hardness as well as reconfigurability, making it particularly attractive
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for space-based systems. This section provides a brief background of SRAM-based
FPGAs in space, an overview of the Xilinx Virtex-5QV FPGA and its radiation-
hardened features, and radiation test results for the Virtex-5QV.
2.5.1 SRAM-based FPGA Space Flight Heritage
A brief survey of several publicly announced space missions using SRAM-based FP-
GAs appears in this section to provide a background on SRAM-based FPGA space
flight heritage and resources for examining past system designs, fault tolerance meth-
ods, and radiation-induced error rates. This summary is not exhaustive, but repre-
sents an attempt to locate and document published records of SRAM-based FPGAs
in space.
4000 Series and Virtex
In 2003, the Virtex XQR4062XL, part of the XC4000XL series, flew on the Aus-
tralian FedSat mission [25] [80]. In 2007, Los Alamos National Laboratory launched
CFESat, which used three Virtex XQVR1000 FPGAs as the data processors for its
reconfigurable computer experiments [27]. Two Virtex XQVR1000s were the main
controllers of all brushed DC and stepper motors on the Discovery and Spirit rovers
of the Mars Exploration Rover Mission, and four XQR4062XL devices controlled the
Mars lander pyrotechnics [75]. Interestingly, the Xilinx FPGAs on the Mars rover
mission were left powered on during the seven month cruise from Earth to Mars, and
during that time the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) collected upset rate data [75].
Virtex-4 and Virtex-5
The Materials International Space Station Experiment (MISSE) is a series of ex-
periments focused on testing the effects of a space environment on materials and
computing elements. One of the MISSE-7 experiments is the Single Event Up-
set Xilinx-Sandia Experiment(SEUXSE) [66], which contains the space grade grade
Virtex-4QVFX60 and the commercial grade Virtex-5LX330T [38]. Along with other
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paylaods on STS-129, SEUXSE launched to the ISS on November 16, 2009, where
astronauts deployed the experiment on November 23, 2009.
On the MISSE-8, Xilinx, Sandia National Laboratories, and other partners placed
the SEUXSE II experiment, which contains a Virtex-4QV and a Virtex-5QV [80].
SEUXSE II launched as a payload on STS-134, arriving at the ISS on May 16, 2011,
where astronauts deployed it for operation on May 20, 2011. STS-134 also returned
the MISSE-7 experiment back to earth.
The SpaceCube project at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has fo-
cused on high performance reconfigurable science data processing based on Xilinx
Virtex FPGAs, resulting in several successful missions. The project launched two
commercial grade Virtex-4 FPGAs as part of Hubble Servicing Mission 4 in May
2009 and a commercial Virtex-5 on a sounding rocket flight in 2011. The SpaceCube
team is set to launch three additional commercial grade Virtex-5QV FPGAs on the
STP-H4 Department of Defense Space Test Program experiment bound for the Inter-
national Space Station (ISS) and also plans to fly the Virtex-5QV in a CubeSat form
factor. [86]
Another set of experiment carrying the Virtex-4 are the two Los Alamos Experi-
mental Units (LEUs) on the Mission Response Module (MRM) experimental payload
on a Department of Defense satellite, each containing one space grade XQR4VLX200
(Virtex-4QVLX200) and one space grade XQR4VSX55 (Virtex-4QVSX55) [73]. The
LEUs are exposed to particularly harsh radiation environment due to their orbit pro-
file, making for an interesting study of SEU prediction rates vs. observed error rates
and the effects of shielding [73].
JPL’s Cubesat On-board processing Validation Experiment (COVE) payload,
which flew on the University of Michigan’s M-cubed CubeSat mission in 2011, is
based on the Virtex-5QV for high performance processing [70] [23]. At the time of
this writing, ground control operators were unable to send commands to the M-cubed
satellite, due to magnetic coupling of M-cubed with another nanosatellite onboard the
launch vehicle following the release of the nanosatellites from the launcher. However,
a reflight of the COVE payload is scheduled for late 2013.
61
To provide some context for comparing the radiation-hardness of the Xilinx FP-
GAs listed in this section, Table 2.4 shows the specified TID hardness and minimum
latchup immunity for the different Xilinx space grade SRAM-based FPGA families.
Table 2.4: TID rating and SEL immunity for various space-grade Xilinx FPGAs




Xilinx QPro XQR4000XL[88] 60 100
Xilinx QPro Virtex[90] 100 125
Xilinx QPro Virtex-II[89] 200 160
Xilinx Virtex-4QV[9] 300 125
Xilinx Virtex-5QV[95] 1000 125
2.5.2 Virtex-5QV RHBD Features
For Xilinx, the Virtex-5QV is the first product with extensive RHBD features; Virtex-
4QV and earlier space-grade FPGAs use(d) exactly the same mask and circuitry as
a particular revision of their commercial counterpart [83]. Dual-node configuration
cells, 12 transistor flip flops, and epitaxial CMOS process technology provide RHBD
protection for the Virtex-5QV. The Virtex-5QV is manufactured on a 65-nm process
size.
Each RHBD configuration cell in the Virtex-5QV consists of two distinct nodes
with internal redundancy to prevent any single node collecting charge from upsetting
the configuration bit, although a brief transient on the cell output is possible [83].
Unless two nodes collect at least the minimum charges Qcrit1 and Qcrit2, the cell will
not upset after an SEE interaction [61]. The pairs of nodes that can induce upset
by simultaneously collecting charge are intentionally spaced a certain distance apart.
This results in an upset susceptibility for a given ion that varies a few orders of
magnitude depending on an ion’s entry angle into the device, with the vector aligned
with the straight line between the two nodes being the most sensitive direction [83].
The Virtex-5QV uses Xilinx’s 12 transistor (12T) flip flop design with SET filters
to lower SET effects [83], as shown in Figure 2-16. The flip flops (registers) require
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dual inputs that must agree to alter register state. This dual input design facilitates
temporal filtering on the flip flops [28].
The use of epitaxial CMOS process technology has made Virtex Single Event
latch-up immune to a LET threshold greater than 120 MeV/mg. The epitaxial layer
eliminates the capacitive build up that occurs between the doped regions and the sub-
strate, significantly attenuating the ability for excess charge from a charged particle
interaction to build up and cause a transistor’s state to switch [65].
Figure 2-16: Dual node flip flops with SET filters implemented in Virtex-5QV [84]
2.5.3 Virtex-5QV Hardened and UnHardened Components
The primary focus of radiation hardening in design of the Virtex-5QV was to max-
imize hardness against configuration bit errors. Thus, some of the special function
hardware modules in the device remain equivalent to those in the commercial Virtex-5
and are not hardened against radiation-induced effects. Table 2.5 provides a listing
of the RHBD features of the Virtex-5QV and the unhardened features.
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Table 2.5: XQR5VFX130 Feature Set [83]
Functional Block Available Resources SEU Mitigation
Logic Cells 131,072 RHBD
6-Input LUTs, CLB-FFs 81,920 RHBD
Distributed RAM (kBit) 1,580 RHBD
BRAM Blocks (36kBit) 298 EDAC
Total BRAM (kBit) 10,368 EDAC
Clock Tiles 6 (4 PLL, 2 DCM) None
DSP48E2 Slices 320 None
MGT3 Channels 18 None
PCIe Blocks4 3 None
EMACs5 6 None
User IO (MGT) 836 (18) None
2.5.4 Xilinx TMRTool
To support design with the Virtex-4QV and Virtex-5QV, Xilinx developed a special-
ized synthesis software package called TMRTool. Traditional TMR does not protect
against SEUs in voting logic or against SETs, nor does it easily support the re-
configurability of Xilinx FPGAs [14]. TMRTool specifically addresses theses issues
and ensures the final logic programmed into the FPGA correctly implements TMR.
To achieve these goals, the Xilinx TMR approach involves [14]:
1. Triplication of all inputs, including clocks and throughput (combinational) logic
2. Triplication of feedback logic and insertion of majority voters on feedback paths
3. Triplication of all outputs, using minority voters to detect and disable incorrect
output paths
TMRTool is available from Xilinx but is ITAR-controlled. Thus this work does
not analyze design or implementation with TMRTool.
2Digital Signal Processor
3Multi-Gigabit Transceivers
4Peripheral Component Interconnect Express
5Ethernet Media Access Control
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2.5.5 Virtex-5QV Radiation Testing
The XRTC has performed hundreds of hours of heavy ion and proton testing of
the Virtex-5QV to measure the radiation susceptibility of the configuration memory,
logic cells, and special function hardware modules. For almost all tests, the XRTC
motherboard with appropriate daughter DUT (shown in Figure 2-17) is exposed to
either heavy ions or protons, depending on the test, and monitored for SEFI conditions
and SEU errors.
Figure 2-17: XRTC Motherboard test apparatus with supporting circuitry and inter-
connections used for radiation effects testing [45].
Because Virtex-5 devices are offered only in flip-chip packaging, irradiation is
done through the backside of the silicon substrate. To allow charged particles from
the particle accelerator to reach the active layer at the bottom of the chip with
sufficiently high-LET, the backside of the silicon must be thinned to less than 100
micrometers, as shown in Figure 2-18. In Figure 2-18, the device on the left has been
thinned to approximately 100 micrometers, while the device on the right is un-thinned
[42].
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Figure 2-18: Two FX-1 series Virtex-5QV devices used for XRTC test campaigns [42]
Latchup Testing
For latchup testing, the device junction temperature, internal voltage, I/O voltage,
and auxiliary voltage are held as close as possible to the maximum rated values.
XRTC testers used high energy particles with an effective LET greater than 104
MeV-mg/cm2, and observed no latchups during bombardment. [83]
SEFI Testing
Observed Virtex-5QV SEFIs are placed into two main categories: Design-intrusive,
and Visibility intrusive. In the design-intrusive category are the Power-On-Reset-
like (POR) and the Global Signal (GSIG) SEFIs. The visibility-intrusive category
includes the malfunctions of the SelectMap Port (SMAP) or the Frame Address Reg-
ister (FAR). [83]
Static Testing
As mentioned previously, static effects are errors caused by radiation-induced upsets
to the bit-value stored in any storage element, such as configuration cells, user flip
flops, or BRAM. A summary of static radiation testing of the Virtex-5QV performed
by various members of the XRTC appears in Table 2.6.
66
Table 2.6: Static radiation test results summary for Virtex-5QV [84]
XQR5VFX130 MTTU Units Details
SEFIs 9,930 years/Device Mean Time to SEFI
CLB-Flip Flop (filters on) 3 upsets/century all 81,920 bits
CLB-Flip Flop (filters off) 1-2 upsets/year all 81,920 bits
Configuration Bits 5 upsets/year all 34.1 million bits
Block Memory (EDAC off) 13 upsets/day all 10.9 million bits
Dynamic Testing
As described previously in this chapter, dynamic effects are upsets that result from
inadvertent latching of transitory or SETs in the control, clocking and access circuitry
of a storage cell. A summary of dynamic radiation test results performed by various
members of the XRTC appears in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Dynamic radiation test results summary for Virtex-5QV [84]
XQR5VFX130 MTTU6 Units Upset and Op Details
DCM, PLL 130 years / DCM or
PLL
Glitch, 12 DCMs + 6 PLLs
MGTs 20 years/GTX LOL7 18 GTX’s, 3.125 GHz
Block Memory
(EDAC on)
12 years/Device all 10.9 million bits
CLB-FF (filters on) 2.5 years/Device all 81,920 bits, 200 MHz
CLB-FF (filters off) 2 months/Device all 81,920 bits, 200 MHz
DSP48E 5 years/DSP 320 DSPs in Device
IODELAY 32 years/bit 836 IO’s in Device
EMAC TBD – –
PCIe TBD – –
The static and dynamic radiation test results demonstrate the effectiveness of
RHBD techniques employed in the design and fabrication of the Virtex-5QV. The




off (estimated 6 errors/year) are the only components with a predicted error rate
more frequent than once every few years. Table 2.8 shows the dramatic improvement
in radiation hardness of the Virtex-5QV as compared to the space grade Virtex-II
Pro and space grade Virtex-4QV.









XQR2V6000[26] 13.3 2.03 181
XQR4VFX60[43] 4.4 3.26 103
XQR5VFX130T[84] 0.014 0.0023 8 9930
2.6 Conclusion
SRAM-based FPGAs offer significant design flexibility and impressive processing ca-
pability for space-based missions, at the cost of increased radiation-induced error
vulnerabilities as compared to RadHard antifuse FPGAs. By understanding and an-
alyzing the expected mission radiation environment, performing fault injection, and
characterizing the radiation effects response of an FPGA through particle accelera-
tor testing, designers can choose appropriate mitigation techniques to increase the
reliability of an FPGA-based system on orbit. These mitigation techniques come at





Fault Tolerant Design on RHBD
SRAM-based FPGAs
The primary focus of this work is to identify the additional design considerations and
factors recommended for designing with a RHBD SRAM-based FPGA in a space-
based embedded system as well as to characterize the system design space resulting
from applying the additional design techniques. The Xilinx Virtex-5QV FPGA is the
RHBD SRAM-based FPGA analyzed in this work, as at the time of this writing it
is the only such FPGA in commercial production. The additional considerations in
fault tolerant system design with a RHBD SRAM-based FPGA are implementation
of configuration bitstream management and scrubbing, protection of unhardened,
special purpose hardware blocks through fault tolerance and redundancy, and softcore
processor fault tolerance and watchdog application.
The analysis presented in this work assumes TMR is not necessary for logic mod-
ules implemented with LUTs and flip flops in the Virtex-5QV due to the inherent
design effort to harden most of the internal components of the FPGA. Thus this
work does not analyze the additional costs of applying TMR to user logic designs
on the Virtex-5QV. However, this work does consider redundancy techniques for the
special function hardware modules of the Virtex-5QV.
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3.1 Configuration Bitstream Scrubbing
The reliability of the configuration bitstream is essential to SRAM-based FPGA op-
eration. If the bitstream stored in non-volatile memory is unintentionally altered
(e.g. by an SEU) before loading onto the FPGA, then the user design represented
by the bitstream could operate incorrectly or fail entirely. If the FPGA configuration
programmed by the bitstream is altered while the user design is operating on the
FPGA, it could cause errors in the design operation or failure of the design.
As noted previously, because less than ten percent of configuration cells have a
direct effect on a typical user design, nine out of ten configuration SEUs will have
no effect on the user design [33]. However, if an SEU flips a critical bit in the design
(the bit controlling the global reset for example) then it does not matter that the
previous nine SEU-induced bit flips had no effect on the design’s operation, because
the design has suffered a major fault from the critical bit flip. Thus taking design steps
to mitigate the effects of SEUs in the configuration memory is essential to reliable
SRAM-based FPGA in the space environment.
As outlined in Chapter 2, both external and internal approaches exist to configu-
ration management and bitstream scrubbing. External scrubbing usually involves a
RadHard ASIC or OTP FPGA [21], such as an Actel RTAX or Aeroflex Eclipse. An
internal scrubbing design typically uses internal hardware modules and supporting
user logic to detect single and double bit errors and correct single bit errors, and
an internal design should at least include an external watchdog timer or circuit of
some kind[21]. A trade space exists when making a design choice between adding an
external device versus relying on internal hardware modules for configuration man-
agement and scrubbing. Although external scrubbers are more reliable than internal
self-scrubbers, external scrubbers consume more power and board area and require
additional design effort to implement [51].
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3.1.1 Virtex-5 Bitstream Considerations
Table 3.1 shows the bitstream sizes for the Virtex-5FX70T and the Virtex-5FX130T,
both of which are used in this work to estimate design resource use and power con-
sumption. The Virtex-5 configuration bitstream is divided into configuration frames
of 1,312 bits each (41 words of 32-bits each) [13]. Additionally, each configuration
frame contains 12 built-in ECC bits (bits 640 to 651) and 16 unused bits (bits 656 to
671). Figure 3-1 shows the position of the 12 ECC bits and 16 unused bits in each
configuration frame for the Virtex-5 family. For use in estimating design cross sec-
tion and error rates, Table 3.2 shows the approximate number of configuration bits
controlling the primary device components and hardware modules of the Virtex-5
family.




Any SEU-induced change to the ECC bits has no change on the active design.
Although less obvious, invariably eight to 13% of the bits in the configuration memory
are immune to SEU-induced alteration and can be subtracted from the total config-
uration size when calculating the device cross section [33]. Additionally, although
routing control bits account for over 60% of the configuration bits, a typical user
design only uses approximately 10 to 20% of the available routing resources [30].
Figure 3-1: Position of ECC bits and unused bits in a single Virtex-5 configuration
frame [32]
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Table 3.2: Approximate number of configuration bits associated with most common
Virtex-5 device features [33]
Device Feature Appoximate Number of
Configuration Bits
1 logic slice 1,181
1 BRAM (36 kbits) 1,170
1 BRAM (18 kbits) 585
1 I/O block 2657
1 DSP48E slice 4,592
Dynamic Reconfiguration Port Bits
Dynamic reconfiguration port (DRP) bits allow a user design to change certain condi-
tions in hardware functional blocks (clock management tiles and gigabit transceivers)
while the blocks are operational [13]. XRTC radiation testing has shown certain DRP
bits appear as“stuck bits” to an external scrubber, or show readback differences an
external configuration manager cannot correct through scrubbing [87]. The number
of DRP bits in the Virtex-5QV FPGA per hardware module is:
1. DCM: 369 bits/instance (4,428 total in the device)
2. PLL: 496 bits/instance (2,976 total in the device)
3. GTX: 1,280 bits/GTX DUAL tile (12,800 total in the device)
A total of 13,665 DRP bits exist in the Virtex-5QV FPGA. However, 13,665 is a
conservative count because many DRP bits are unassigned memory cells that do not
control any functionality. Thus, these unassigned bits may be subtracted from the
total. [87]
3.1.2 External Scrubbing
In an external scrubbing scheme, the external scrubber is generally a space qual-
ified FPGA (typically OTP), PLD, or ASIC. For example, commercially available
Virtex-5 based processing boards use RadHard Actel FPGAs and older generation Xil-
inx Radiation-Tolerant FPGAs to provide configuration management and bitstream
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Figure 3-2: External configuration manager interface to non-volatile memory and
SelectMAP interface to Virtex-4QV FPGA [31]
scrubbing [3] [19]. The XRTC test apparatus for Virtex-5QV radiation testing has
employed both the Virtex II Pro and additional Virtex-5QVs as external configuration
managers [87].
In the setup shown in Figure 3-2, the external configuration manager accesses the
FPGA (a Virtex-4QV in this case) via the SelectMAP interface, which is the most
efficient and comprehensive device access for configuration and mitigation [31]. The
configuration manager has control of the data lines to the FPGA’s configuration, as
well as capability to read the control signals that provide the configuration status of
the FPGA.
Upon system power up, the configuration manager starts programming the FPGA
as soon as the INIT pin is taken high or after the power on time (TPOR) requirement
specified in the device data sheet. Once power up and configuration is successfully
completed, the configuration manager enters the SEE mitigation process, which con-
sists of SEFI checking and active partial reconfiguration. SEFI checking steps through
frame address register (FAR), status register (STAT), and Control register (CTL) to
verify the status and functionality of each register. Figure 3-3 provides a flow chart
for external configuration management and bitstream scrubbing, and the reader may
examine Carmichael and Tseng’s application note [31] for details on the SelectMAP
command and data sequence for register test, register readback, and scrubbing.
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Figure 3-3: Flow chart for external configuration management and bitstream scrub-
bing [31]
Advantages of External Scrubbing
External scrubbing provides the opportunity to compare the active bitstream values to
a golden copy of the bitstream stored in external non-volatile memory. Also, external
scrubbers have the ability to correct any number of configuration errors because they
are not constrained to relying on SECDED methods to detect and correct errors
[24]. Additionally, external scrubbing provides the opportunity to deal with non-
configuration bit upsets via use of a mask file [87], which can eliminate false positive
configuration bit upset detection.
Disadvantages of External Scrubbing
The disadvantages of an external configuration manager and scrubber are increased
cost, increased power consumption, increased board area, increased design complexity,
and decreased design flow flexibility. In external scrubbing schemes, the configuration
monitors are usually radiation hardened devices that are often OTP, meaning a design
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error or a desired modification to the configuration management algorithm frequently
results in an additional device burn or even an entire board re-spin, resulting in
additional system cost and possible delay of design release/system implementation
[30].
3.1.3 Internal Scrubbing
Internal bitstream monitoring and scrubbing techniques for the Virtex family of FP-
GAs typically use a combination of the Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP),
Frame ECC, and Readback CRC internal hardware modules (also known as user
primitives). The ICAP and Frame ECC are available in the Virtex-II, Virtex-4, and
Virtex-5 families, while the Readback CRC only is available in the Virtex-5 family.
A brief description of each of the hardware modules appears below.
ICAP
The ICAP hardware module allows user designs to access configuration registers,
readback configuration data, or partially reconfigure the FPGA after configura-
tion is complete [13]. The interface of the ICAP resembles the interface used by
the traditional SelectMap [50], with a selectable data width of 8-bits, 16-bits,
or 32-bits [13].
Frame ECC
The Frame ECC logic is designed to detect single-bit and double-bit errors and
in each configuration frame of the FPGA using the 12 ECC bits built into each
frame as SECDED Hamming code parity values [13]. The Frame ECC module
does not repair erroneous bits in a configuration frame; a user design is required
to recognize errors in syndrome values and then correct altered bits [13].
Readback CRC
The Readback CRC module continuously scans (reads) the configuration cells
of the device in the background while a user design is in operation. Initially,
the readback CRC calculates a golden CRC value for each frame, to which
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subsequent rounds of readback CRC values are compared. If the CRC value
computed by a scan differs from the goldenCRC value, a change to the con-
figuration has occurred [33], which the readback CRC indicates by driving the
CRC error pin of the Frame ECC primitive high and driving the INIT B pin low
[13]. LUT-based memory storage, BRAM content, and Dynamic Reconfigura-
tion Port memories are masked during background readback by the Readback
CRC module [13].
Internal configuration bitstream scrubbing has been the subject of several uni-
versity research efforts, as well as Xilinx development efforts. This section presents
three internal configuration schemes: two provided by Xilinx, and one published by
researchers at BYU. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of internal scrubbing
are presented and analyzed.
SelectMAP Internal Configuration Manager
As shown in Figure 3-4, designers can implement an internal configuration monitor
using Master SelectMAP Mode. In this Xilinx-based design [30], the “self-hosting
configuration management core” can perform bitstream readback, scrubbing, SEFI
detection, and other specialized configuration management as required [29].
The external watchdog and oscillator shown in Figure 3-4 provide a fallback mech-
anism in the event of a configuration failure or SEFI. If the configuration management
core detects a SEFI, it then asserts the SEFI signal to the watchdog so the watchdog
will reset the FPGA. The configuration core periodically should pat the watchdog
with a reset signal to reset the watchdog’s counter. If the configuration manager
fails to assert the reset signal, then the watchdog should pulse the PROG pin on the
FPGA to trigger a full reconfiguration of the FPGA. [29]
The two primary disadvantages to the internal SelectMAP scheme described above
are the number of additional I/O pins required and the possibility of a radiation-
induced error causing the internal configuration monitor to write erroneous values to
the bitstream stored in the non-volatile memory array.
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Figure 3-4: Block diagram of single FPGA in Master SelectMAP Mode implementing
a triplicated configuration management scheme [30]
BYU Virtex-4 Internal Scrubber
Researchers at BYU developed an internal bitstream scrubber using the internal ICAP
and Frame ECC hardware modules to implement SECDED [50], with process control
implemented on a Xilinx PicoBlaze softcore microprocessor. Figure 3-5 shows a block
diagram of the BYU internal scrubber system. Using instruction memory stored in
BRAM, the PicoBlaze accesses the ICAP module to correct single-bit errors in the
configuration memory. Since the internal scrubbing design is vulnerable to SEUs
during operation, the BYU team added TMR and BRAM scrubbing to the design to
increase its reliability, as shown in Figure 3-6.
Testing of the BYU design with the Avnet Virtex-4LX25 evaluation board at the
Crocker Cyclotron demonstrated the triplicated scrubber achieved a fluence to failure
3.6 times larger than the unmitigated scrubber [50]. As one might expect, additional
reliability and fault tolerance came at a price: the utilization numbers in Table 3.3
demonstrate how applying TMR to the design doubled the logic utilization and tripled
the BRAM usage.
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Figure 3-5: Block diagram of hardware modules and custom logic in BYU’s ICAP-
based internal scrubber [50]
Figure 3-6: PicoBlaze processor BRAM memory protected with TMR and scrubbing
[50]
Xilinx Virtex-5 Internal SEU Controller
In a similar fashion to the BYU Virtex-4 internal scrubber, the Xilinx Virtex-5 SEU
Controller uses the ICAP and Frame ECC hardware modules within the Virtex-
5 family along with a PicoBlaze processor to provide internal SECDED bitstream
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Table 3.3: Resource Utilization for BYU internal scrubber, shown with and without
TMR on the Virtex-4LX25 [50]
Resource Non-TMR TMR
Flip Flops 680 (3%) 1082 (5%)
Slices 736 (6%) 1308 (12%)
BRAM 2 6
scrubbing. The primary difference between the two designs is the use of the Virtex-
5’s built-in readback CRC hardware module in the SEU controller; the Virtex-4 family
does not contain a readback CRC. When a frame containing an error is scanned, the
SEU controller detects the resulting syndrome ECC error and triggers the correction
procedure immediately [33].
Figure 3-7: Readback CRC block diagram for internal scrubbing of FPGA bitstream
[33]
Table 3.4 gives time required for each readback CRC scan of the Virtex-5 bit-
stream. The worst case time for the SEU controller to detect and repair a bitstream
error is the time to complete a full scan. Following error correction, the effects the er-
ror had on operational states and data might continue and a localized reset to circuits
might be appropriate [33].
For comparison to the other internal bitstream scrubbing designs, build results
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Table 3.4: Readback CRC clock cycle and scan times for Virtex-5 SEU Controller
[33]










XC5VFX70T 611,686 10.19 32.19
XC5VFX130T 1,100,816 18.35 57.94
for the SEU controller on the Virtex-5FX70T using the ML507 development board
appear in Table 3.5, and power consumption estimates are shown in Table 3.6.
Table 3.5: Resource Utilization for Virtex-5 SEU Controller Macro on Virtex-5FX70T
Hardware Resource Used Available Utilization
Slice Register 329 44800 1%
Slice LUT 343 44800 1%
Block RAM (18 kB) 1 148 1%
ICAP 1 2 50%
As with most internal scrubbing designs, one disadvantage of this approach is
vulnerability of the scrubbing components themselves to SEU-induced configuration
upsets and SETs. For example, the 12 internal ECC bits in a configuration frame
themselves might also be flipped by an SEU. This would not cause a change to the
user design, but could cause the SEU controller to incorrectly detect an error in
the configuration bitstream and alter the bitstream. If higher reliability of the SEU
controller is necessary, the BRAM storing the instruction memory of the PicoBlaze
could be triplicated, as was done in the BYU ICAP-based scrubber design.
Table 3.6: Power consumption estimate for Xilinx Virtex-5 SEU controller imple-
mented on Virtex-5FX70T
Parameter Quiescent Dynamic Total
Supply Power (W) 1.057 0.055 1.112
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Internal Configuration Scrubbing and Partial Reconfiguration
Since most published internal scrubbing schemes use an ICAP hardware module to
access the configuration bitstream of the FPGA, concern exists when designing for
partial reconfiguration in a system using internal scrubbing. Although each device
in the Virtex-5 family contains two ICAP modules, only one may be active at any
one time. Research has indicated partial reconfiguration and configuration bitstream
scrubbing can be integrated into a single design [51].
Advantages of Internal Scrubbing
The advantages of an internal configuration monitor revolve around independence of
an additional external device, which reduces cost, power, and board area. Addition-
ally, an internal scrubbing scheme is free of the limited design flow typically associated
with an external OTP configuration monitor. Since the scrubbing is implemented on
a reconfigurable SRAM-based FPGA, internal configuration monitoring and scrub-
bing designs offer reduced hardware cost and more design flow flexibility at the cost
of increased SEU cross section associated with increased use of internal hardware
modules and supporting internal logic.
Disadvantages of Internal Scrubbing
Internal scrubbers are limited to either CRC-based or SECDED (dependence on syn-
drome length) error correction due to the lack of direct access to a golden config-
uration bitstream for comparing current bitstream values with intended bitstream
values [24]. Another disadvantage is the vulnerability is the ICAP, frame ECC, and
readback CRC hardware modules themselves, which are used to calculate the CRC or




After SEL, SEFIs represent the second most detrimental radiation induced effect in
an SRAM-based FPGA (assuming SEB and SEGR do not occur). Therefore, a fault
tolerant design should provide a mechanism for detecting and, if possible, correcting
SEFI conditions. The most direct way to detect SEFIs in an SRAM-based FPGA is
to monitor the FPGA’s internal configuration registers [87]. In an external scheme,
directly monitoring the DONE and INIT pins provides insight into the status of the
configuration. In an internal configuration monitoring scheme, the user design could
periodically read the configuration registers (via the ICAP hardware module) and
check for incorrect values. If an incorrect configuration register value is detected, a
variety of responses are possible, and designers should tailor a solution to the specific
application and user design.
3.1.5 Configuration Scrubbing Summary
Table 3.7 presents a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of internal
scrubbing and external scrubbing schemes.
Table 3.7: Comparison of external and internal scrubbing schemes
Parameter External Scrubber Internal Scrubber
Error Detection More Capable Less Capable
Error Correction More Capable Less Capable
Design Flexibility Lower Higher
Design Complexity Higher Lower
Power Consumption Higher Lower
Cost Higher Lower
3.2 Hardware Modules for Redundancy
This section examines additional mitigation techniques and considerations for the
non-RHBD special function hardware modules in the Virtex-5QV. With the exception
of BRAM, XRTC upset rate estimates are low for the unhardened hardware modules
82
(see Tables 2.6 and 2.7); however, the error rates resulting from radiation testing
do not predict error arrival times [73]. Therefore, designers should be aware of the
additional mitigation techniques and consider applying them to better protect user
designs in the space radiation environment.
3.2.1 Block RAM and FIFO
For designs requiring internal memory storage (most designs use a large proportion
of available BRAM [33]), protecting user memory is essential for reliable design op-
eration. Since BRAM cells switch quickly between states during operation, they
are more susceptible to SEUs than configuration cells, which are required to remain
static during most (if not all) of operation [33]. First In First Out (FIFO) storage
elements also are implemented using Block RAM in the Virtex-5 family. Radiation
testing of the Virtex-5QV has demonstrated the BRAM is the most vulnerable of
the unhardened special function blocks within the Virtex-5QV, with an estimated 13
upsets/day due to radiation effects in a geostationary orbit (see Table 2.6) with error
correcting code (ECC) functionality disabled. Enabling ECC significantly reduces
the upset rate to 12 years/device (see Table 2.7). Although ECC is quite effective at
protecting BRAM cells from SEUs, implementing it comes at a cost. As this section
will quantify, enabling ECC constrains the maximum clock frequency at which a user
design may operate.
Each of the Virtex-5QV’s 298 BRAM blocks are configurable as 512 x 64-bit
RAM with eight ECC bits for every 64-bit word. When ECC is enabled, the 8-bit
parity checksum is used during every read operation to detect and correct single-bit
errors, and to detect (but not correct) double-bit errors. During a write, the parity
checksum is generated and stored. For every word read, the 72-bits are fed into an
ECC decoder that generates status bits indicating: no error, single-bit error detected
and corrected, or double-bit error detected [18]. The BRAM words are implemented
with an interleaved bit separation scheme such that every bit in the word is in a
separate BRAM block [44]. This interleaving decreases the likelihood of a multi-bit
upset causing a double bit or larger error the SECDED ECC system cannot correct.
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As shown in Table 3.8, taken from the Virtex-5QV DC Switching User Guide [11],
260 MHz is the maximum frequency at which a design may use BRAM in ECC mode.
If the writeback mode of the ECC is enabled, the maximum frequency for BRAM
further decreases to 180 MHz. Comparing the maximum frequencies available in the
Virtex-5QV, using ECC with BRAM can half the maximum possible BRAM access
frequency, which significantly reduces maximum design speed available.
Table 3.8: BRAM maximum operating frequencies for Virtex-5QV [11]
BRAM Use Case Virtex-5QV Max
Frequency(MHz)
Block RAM in all modes 360
Block RAM in Cascade mode 320
FIFO in all modes 360
Block RAM in ECC mode 260
Block RAM in ECC mode with writeback enabled 180
A small power increase results from adding ECC to BRAM in a user design; how-
ever, as shown in Table 3.9, the increase in power required to implement ECC on
BRAM is not significant. Thus the power cost associated with implementing ECC
on BRAM modules is likely acceptable in most systems. BRAM power consumption
estimates in Table 3.9 were calculated for the Virtex-5FX70T at an ambient tem-
perature of 25◦ Celsius using the Xilinx XPower Analyzer tool and include power
consumption of the I/O blocks used for the address and data lines of the BRAMs.
Table 3.9: Resource utilization and estimated power consumption for BRAM with
and without ECC
Number of BRAMs BRAM Type ECC Power (W)
1 Single Port None 1.012
2 Single Port None 1.031
3 Single Port None 1.048
1 Simple Dual Port None 1.016
2 Simple Dual Port None 1.035
3 Simple Dual Port None 1.053
1 Simple Dual Port ECC 1.022
2 Simple Dual Port ECC 1.048
3 Simple Dual Port ECC 1.065
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MIG and MPMC
The Xilinx Memory Interface Generator (MIG) implements memory controllers for
interfacing internal user logic to external memory devices (such as SDRAM) and
typically employs BRAMs to pass data between the user design and the external
memory component. The Multi-Port Memory Controller (MPMC) IP core uses MIG
to implement memory interfaces between external memories and internal hardcore
processors (PowerPC) and softcore processors (MicroBlaze) on the Virtex-5 [93]. The
MIG uses standard Virtex-5 BRAMs, which are not radiation hardened but do include
ECC options. Although data may not remain in the BRAMs used by the MIG
for lengthy periods of time, subject to the use case of the design, the data still
is vulnerable to upset while stored there. The cost of adding ECC to the MIG
and MPMC BRAMs is additional FPGA resource utilization and increased power
consumption.
Softcore Processor Memory in BRAM
For softcore processor applications, designers may choose to locate the instruction and
data memory in internal BRAM, rather than solely in external electrically erasable
programmable read only memory (EEPROM) and/or SRAM, or to employ BRAM
instruction and data caches for externally stored memory. Several studies of soft-
core processors on FPGAs have demonstrated the significant performance speedups
achievable by relying solely on BRAM for instruction/data memory storage or using
BRAM for instruction/data caches, as compared to external instruction/data memory
storage [35] [64]. Mitigation techniques for the unhardened BRAMs in the MicroBlaze
softcore processor appear later in this chapter, along with the design trades associated
with their use.
3.2.2 DCM and PLL Blocks
The possibility of SEU-induced clock signal failures poses significant risk to syn-
chronous mission-critical embedded systems. The Digital Clock Manager (DCM) and
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Phase Locked Loop (PLL) hardware modules that provide clock frequency synthesis
(output frequency increase or decrease via multiplication of an input frequency) and
de-skew are not RHBD in the Virtex-5QV. Thus the addition of mitigation tech-
niques to the non-RadHard DCM/PLL blocks can become key to ensuring reliable
clock signal generation for correct system functionality.
If, for example, a design employs a DCM to generate a multiplication or division of
the input clock frequency, and a charged particle interaction induces a change in the
configuration memory controlling the DCM, the effects could be severe. If the SEE
causes the DCM to lower the output frequency from that which the design originally
intended, then the design may under-perform. This under performance might result
in decreased payload functionality and/or degraded communication rates with other
systems onboard the spacecraft or with ground control. In the case of precision
attitude control, a significant decrease in clock speed could cause a catastrophic failure
in the system’s ability to control the spacecraft’s position and orientation. As another
example, if the SEE causes the DCM to unintentionally increase its output frequency,
the higher clock speed could result in the design no longer meeting timing constraints,
which could produce a multitude of error and failures. From a payload perspective, if
the clock frequency controlling the interface to the spacecraft bus/primary avionics is
altered, it could result in inability of the payload to communicate with the spacecraft,
thus eliminating any payload data production and the possibility of diagnosing the
issues from the ground.
The Xilinx-recommended solution is to bring in the clock signal directly from
an external clock source (such as an oscillator) to a clock buffer, without passing
it through a DCM or PLL [33], as shown in Figure 3-8. This reduces the risk of
relying on a DCM or PLL to produce the system clock for an entire user design.
Including a DCM or PLL and interconnect logic in the clock path results in additional
configuration bits being used in the design, which increases (by a small amount) the
chance of SEU upset [32]. If system design requires on-chip clock multiplication in
the form of DCM or PLL, then a PLL provides slightly higher reliability than a
DCM because it requires fewer configuration bits than a DCM, which decreases its
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Figure 3-9: Mitigated design for DCM and/or PLL which adds redundancy into the
clock network [42]
cross-section to SEUs [32].
Figure 3-8: Direct connection of clock signal from external oscillator to logical block
within user design [33]
Adding Redundant Clock modules
As listed in Chapter 2, the XRTC has produced radiation-induced upset estimates
for the Virtex-5QV DCM and PLL modules in geosynchronous orbit. In radiation
testing campaigns of the DCM and PLL blocks in 2011, the XRTC used a mitigated
design to increase the area of the device under test (DUT) and evaluate a possible
mitigation technique [42]. This mitigated design, shown in Figure 3-9, also could
provide redundancy against SEU errors, at the cost of additional hardware utilization.
The arrangement shown in Figure 3-9 did not use triple modular redundancy
during radiation testing. Instead, the validation circuit compared the output of the
primary DCM (DCM1) to an expected value, and counted each clock cycle as valid if
that value was correct. If the validation circuit determined the primary DCM’s output
was incorrect, it switched to the secondary DCM’s (DCM2) output until the primary
DCM recovered. Observed error signatures in the DCM and PLL blocks during
radiation testing by the XRTC were altered frequency, clock glitches, or completely
87
Table 3.10: Logic and power consumption costs of multiple DCMs on Virtex-5FX70T,
input clock of 100 MHz, output clock of 125 MHz






Table 3.11: Logic and power consumption costs of multiple PLLs on the Virtex-
5FX70T, input clock of 100 MHz, output clock of 133 MHz







arrested functionality. Recovery from the arrested functionality error consisted of a
reset to the Clock Management Tile and configuration bitstream scrub [42].
Using the design shown in Figure 3-9 as a baseline, a designer could add additional
redundancy to the DCM/PLL system by adding a third DCM to the system. Table
3.10 provides an estimate of the logic resource and power consumption costs associated
with adding additional DCMs to a Virtex-5 design. Power consumption estimates
were calculated for the Virtex-5FX70T at 25◦ Celsius ambient temperature using the
Xilinx XPower Analyzer tool.
The numbers presented in Table 3.10 are for reference because they were gen-
erated without any additional logic corresponding to a user design implemented on
the FPGA. The build results indicate adding additional DCMs comes at the cost of
about 1 logic slice and 100 mW per DCM, although adding redundant DCMs in an
actual user design could involve more logic and power resources due to the specific
requirements of the design.
Estimates for employing additional PLLs appear in Table 3.11, calculated for the
Virtex-5FX70T. As with the DCM resource use estimates, the PLL resource estimates
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are provided for reference; they do not include additional user logic that would appear
in a design and use the output of the PLL(s) for operation. The build results indicate
adding an additional PLL requires about 150 mW. It is important to note the PLL
hardware modules in the Virtex-5 family are capable of providing more clock outputs
than the DCMs, and the PLLs are separated by physical location either on the top
or bottom of the Virtex-5 device. PLLs on the top half of the device are driven only
by global clock pins in I/O Bank 3, while PLLs on the bottom half of the device are
driven only by global clock pins in I/O Bank 4 [18].
Monitoring Clock Module Errors
A simpler option for adding fault tolerance to system design with PLL and/or DCM
modules is to provide a method of monitoring the clock module output(s) for errors.
An error monitoring logic design might detect DCM/PLL output errors and signal
a controlling logic element, which could then reset the malfunctioning clock module.
A block diagram for such an error monitoring scheme appears in Figure 3-10. The
primary clock signal to the error monitor would be the base clock frequency passed
through from an external oscillator, while the other input would be the adjusted
(multiplied up or down) output frequency of the DCM/PLL. The ”output error”
signal from the error monitor would connect to a controlling logic unit, which might
be a softcore processor. These connections would allow the controller unit to reset
the clock module and clear any error conditions if the error monitor detects an error
in the clock module output.
Figure 3-10: PLL error detection scheme
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A designer could apply error monitoring functionality to a DCM/PLL-generated
clock signal feeding a non-critical component of the user logic such as an image
processing block. This would allow the controlling logic module to operate from the
more reliable base clock frequency and reset both the DCM/PLL and the non-critical
user logic component if an error occurs.
3.2.3 Digital Signal Processor Blocks
The DSP blocks in the Virtex-5 family are intended to perform high speed math-
ematical operations and are optimized for such operations. DSPs may operate at
frequencies up to 550 MHz [78] in the Virtex-5 family. On the Virtex-5QV, the DSP
blocks are not hardened against radiation-induced errors.
XRTC SEU effects testing on the DSP48E blocks in the Virtex-5QV took place in
2009 at the Texas A&M Cyclotron and in 2009 at the Lawrence-Berkeley Cyclotron
[78]. Figure 3-11 shows the approximate locations on the Virtex-5QV die of the DSP
blocks tested.
Figure 3-11: Virtex-5QV die diagram showing approximate locations of DSP48E
blocks used in XRTC testing [78]
Analysis of the test results of the Virtex-5QV’s DSP48E blocks predicts a mean
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time to upset (MTTU) per DSP block as low as 15 years/upset for multiplication
operations, 17.5 years/upset for add/subtract operations, and 72.5 years/upset for
accumulate operations, at the tested clock frequencies of 25.0 MHz, 12.5 MHz, and
6.25 MHz [78]. When the test results are extrapolated to operation using a 450
MHz clock, the MTTU decreases to five years per DSP in a geosynchronous orbit(see
Table 2.7). Given the low frequency of upset occurrence, the overall response may be
considered acceptable for many missions, especially since DSPs are usually employed
as high through-put structures [78], meaning a temporary error in the output of a
DSP block likely only would impact the particular calculation at the time and not
result in high impact system faults or failures.
Although most applications may tolerate occasional DSP output errors, other ap-
plications may have more stringent reliability requirements. Unlike ECC on BRAM,
no default error mitigation techniques are built into the DSP blocks of the Virtex-5
family. If a design requires a DSP to meet processing requirements, a designer might
apply a TMR-like approach using multiple DSPs to perform the same calculations,
with a voter to ensure the majority output is passed on to the next circuit element.
Such a scheme appears in Figure 3-12.
Figure 3-12: DSP triplication for additional fault tolerance
As Table 3.12 indicates, the cost of adding additional DSPs to a design can be
quite small, and the Virtex-5QV contains 320 DSP hardware modules [95]. The results
listed in Table 3.12 were generated for the Virtex-5FX70T at an ambient temperature
of 25◦ Celsius using Xilinx XPower Analyzer, with each DSP configured as a 17-bit
x 17-bit unsigned multiplier, with a 35-bit output and 100 MHz input clock. Indeed,
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triplicating each DSP in a design and adding a voter circuit to arbitrate the outputs
of all three DSPs could be feasible without incurring a significant power consumption
increase. However, as with all reliability methods involving hardware redundancy,
the designer should weigh the increased cross sectional area resulting from adding
additional DSPs and arbitration circuitry.
Table 3.12: Logic and power consumption costs of multiple DSP blocks on Virtex-
5FX70T




3.2.4 Other Hardware Modules
The other special function hardware modules in the Virtex-5QV (as well as the Virtex-
5 family) are the Mutli-Gigabit Transceivers (MGTs), Peripheral Component Inter-
connect Express (PCIe), and Ethernet Media Access Control (MAC) blocks. XRTC
testing of the MGT blocks predicts error rates as low as 20 years per transceiver (see
Table 2.7) and the communication channel’s resynchronzation protocol can correct
most errors resulting from SEUs [67]. The XRTC has not performed (or has not
yet released the results) radiation testing on the PCIe and Ethernet MAC hardware
modules. Thus, this work considers additional fault tolerance on the MGT, PCIe,
and Ethernet MAC blocks only minimally.
Mutli-Gigabit Transceivers (MGTs)
The MGT blocks implemented in the Virtex-5 FPGA family are used to transmit high
rate serial data to and from the FPGA, as depicted in Figure 3-13. On the Virtex-
5QV, the MGT blocks are unhardened and are equivalent to the commercial MGT
blocks in the rest of the Virtex-5 family, making them vulnerable to SEU-induced
data loss and bandwidth reduction.
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Figure 3-13: Block diagram of MGT implementation between two FPGAs [59]
To protect the functionality and reliability of high speed data transfer using the
MGT blocks, a designer may implement a protocol on top of the basic MGT func-
tionality. One example is Xilinx’s Aurora protocol, on which XRTC members have
performed radiation tests to determine its effectiveness at mitigating SEU-induced
errors [59]. Aurora is available as an IP Core and only requires approximately 500
logic slices for implementation in the FPGA fabric [59].
As shown previously (see Table 2.7), XRTC estimated error rates are 20 years
per GTX in radiation testing of the unhardened MGT blocks in the Virtex-5QV.
Radiation testing of the MGT blocks on the Virtex-5QV using the Aurora protocol
determined the Aurora protocol can recover from 97% of SEU induced errors. Manual
recovery was required for 2.5$ of SEU events and 0.12% of SEU induced errors required
reconfiguration of the device under test [59]. Thus, in a space-based system utilizing
the MGT blocks within the Virtex-5QV, addition of the Aurora protocol can protect
the unhardened MGT blocks from most SEE-induced errors.
PCIe and Ethernet MAC Blocks
The XRTC has yet to complete testing on the PCIe hardware blocks or the EMAC
hardware blocks of the Virtex-5QV. This thesis does not present fault tolerance tech-
niques for the PCIe or Ethernet MAC blocks in the Virtex-5QV.
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3.3 Softcore Processor Trades
Softcore processors implemented on FPGAs offer space system designers many ben-
efits as compared to RadHard hardcore processors such as the BAE RAD750. Re-
configurability is a primary benefit of softcore processors since operators can change
their characteristics on-orbit. Additionally, softcore processors allow designers to
study trades in internal resource utilization and architectures affecting system per-
formance, reliability, power consumption, and cost. Softcore processors also can offer
decreased system development time as well as flexibility to address changing design
requirements during the development process.
This work analyzes implementation with the Xilinx MicroBlaze softcore processor
on the Virtex-5FX70T and Virtex-5FX130T. Studies of the Leon and MicroBlaze re-
configurable softcore processors implemented on the commercial grade Virtex-4 and
Virtex-5 at Sandia National Laboratories have shown both perform similarly when
using caches [35] [64]. This section first briefly describes the MicroBlaze fault tolerant
hardware and software features provided by Xilinx and then quantifies the resource
and performance costs of implementing the features in a MicroBlaze processor sys-
tem. All Virtex-5 design build results presented were generated using Xilinx Platform
Studio (XPS) version 13.4.
3.3.1 MicroBlaze System Architecture
The MicroBlaze is a 32-bit reduced instruction set computer (RISC), implemented in
the Harvard architecture, and optimized for implementation in Xilinx FPGAs. Xilinx
provides MicroBlaze as an Intellectual Property (IP) core in its Embedded Processor
Development Kit (EDK). The MicroBlaze is highly configurable, supporting a wide
array of optional features and interfaces to external peripherals as well as allowing the
designer to choose a three stage pipeline for area optimization or a five stage pipeline
for performance optimization. [96]
RadHard CLBs are the building blocks of the MicroBlaze in the Virtex-5QV, but
the BRAM modules used as either primary instruction/data memory storage or in-
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struction/data memory caches remain unhardened and the most vulnerable hardware
module in the Virtex-5QV. Thus the facet of MicroBlaze architecture of primary
interest to this work is the memory subsystem. A BRAM memory subsystem for
the MicroBlaze is comprised of the Local Memory Bus (LMB), LMB interface con-
troller, and the BRAM peripheral [92] as shown in Figure 3-14. The Local Memory
Bus(LMB) is a synchronous bus primarily used to access internal BRAM [94], and
the LMB BRAM Interface Controller provides the interface between the LMB and
the BRAM peripheral unit(s) [92].
Figure 3-14: MicroBlaze system with LMB and ECC on LMB controllers [92]
3.3.2 Fault Tolerance Use Cases
To mitigate the effect of SEUs in BRAM storing instruction and data memory, a
designer can configure the LMB BRAM Controller to use ECC functionality. The
controller generates ECC bits ((32,7) Hamming code) and stores them with data
whenever the user program writes data to memory. When reading from BRAM, the
controller uses the ECC bits to correct all single bit errors in the data it passes to
the MicroBlaze and detect all double bit errors in the data read. The controller does
not automatically correct the erroneous memory bits stored in BRAM [34]. If the
controller detects any errors, it signals MicroBlaze via either the PLB, an interrupt
signal through an interrupt controller IP core, or throwing an exception, depending
on the fault tolerance use case selected. The reader may view Table 1 of the LMB
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BRAM datasheet [92] for the coding definition of the (32,7) Hamming code.
The Xilinx EDK provides four different fault tolerance use cases: minimal, small,
typical, and full. A brief description of each use case follows below:
Minimal
In the minimal fault tolerance use case, the ECC logic corrects single bit errors in
data words before the LMB interface controller passes them to the MicroBlaze.
When the ECC logic detects an uncorrectable error in a data word, it sets
an error signal, which generates an exception in the MicroBlaze system. The
minimal system is suitable when area constraints are high and/or no need exists
for testing of the ECC function or analyzing the error frequency and location.
[96]
Small
The small fault tolerance use case is a minimal system with a register added
to record the number of single bit errors (correctable errors). Thus, the small
system provides the capability to monitor error frequency but no capability for
testing of the ECC function. [96]
Typical
The typical fault tolerance use case provides the capabilities to monitor error
frequency and generate an interrupt to immediately correct a single bit error
through user software. It is a small system with a status register and a first
failing address register added. A single bit error latches the address for the
access into the first failing address register and then generates an interrupt
triggering the MicroBlaze to read the failing address and then perform a read
followed by a write on the failing address. The read-read-write sequence will
remove the single bit error from the BRAM. The typical use case does not
provide support for testing of the ECC function. [96]
Full
The full fault tolerance use case employs all of the features provided by the LMB
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BRAM Interface Controller, including enabling full error injection capability,
error monitoring, and interrupt generation. It is a typical system with fault
injection registers and first uncorrectable error address registers added. [96]
3.3.3 Fault Tolerance Implementation Cost and Overhead
BRAM ECC Overhead
Including seven Hamming code bits used by the ECC logic of the LMB interface
controllers for each data word in memory increases the BRAM use for a user design.
The percentage increase in required BRAM size varies by FPGA family, as shown in
Table 3.13.
Table 3.13: BRAM Overhead for implementing ECC [92]
BRAM Data Size Virtex-4 Family Virtex-5 Family
2 kBytes 100% N/A
4 kBytes 50% 100%
8 kBytes 25% 50%
16 kBytes and larger 25% 25%
Resource Utilization
To quantify the effects of applying fault tolerance use cases to a MicroBlaze system,
Table 3.14 shows the resource utilization increase associated with implementing the
four levels of fault tolerance in a basic MicroBlaze design. The resources are based
on an XPS MicroBlaze project with 32 kB BRAM instruction/data memory sys-
tem, Universal Asynchronous Receive Transmit (UART), MicroBlaze Debug Module
(MDM), and Processor System Reset Module (PSRM) IP core peripherals connected
to the MicroBlaze through the Processor Local Bus (PLB), clocked at 100 MHz with
a Clock Manager peripheral (DCM), as shown in Figure 3-15. The full use case
implementation requires a 66 % increase in logic utilization as compared to the stan-
dard MicroBlaze utilization. No interrupt controller or exception handling capability
was added to the typical and full fault tolerance use cases project builds in order to
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provide a baseline for additional hardware modules necessary for fault tolerance.
Figure 3-15: MicroBlaze system used to measure resource use of fault tolerance use
cases
Table 3.14: Resource utilization for MicroBlaze fault tolerance use cases
Fault Tolerance Use Case
Resource None Minimal Small Typical Full
Slice Registers 1528(1.00x) 1884(1.23x) 1884(1.23x) 2251(1.47x) 2539(1.66x)
Slice LUTs 1823(1.00x) 2198(1.21x) 2198(1.21x) 2539(1.39x) 2946(1.62x)
BRAMs 8(1.00x) 10(1.25x) 10(1.25x) 10(1.25x) 10(1.25x)
DSPs 3(1.00x) 3(1.00x) 3(1.00x) 3(1.00x) 3(1.00x)
As with most fault tolerance techniques, there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch
(TANSTAAFL): implementing fault tolerance via ECC in the MicroBlaze BRAM
controllers constrains the design space. Table 3.15 shows timing closure status for
the same basic MicroBlaze system built with different instruction/data BRAM sizes
and system clock speeds. At the maximum selectable system clock frequency available
in XPS for the MicroBlaze system of 125 MHz, no successful timing closure is possible
for any BRAM equal to or above 32 kBytes in size. In Table 3.15, “Pass” indicates a
successful timing closure for the design, while “Fail” indicates failure to meet timing
constraints for the design.
The results shown in Table 3.15 illustrate a primary consideration designers should
take into account when designing with a softcore processor on an SRAM-based FPGA:
incorporating fault tolerance features limits the maximum frequency at which, and
the internal instruction/data memory space with which, a user design may operate.
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Table 3.15: Timing closure results for various instruction/data memory BRAM sizes
with fault tolerance enabled and processor system clock frequencies
Execution Time Costs with Fault Tolerance
Normally, the Xilinx Data2MEM software program initializes the ECC bits in the
configuration bitstream before loading onto the FPGA. However, user software can
also initialize the ECC bits by reading and writing back the whole contents of the
BRAM data while ECC checking is suppressed and then enabling it by writing a ’1’
to the ECC On/Off Register. [96]
While imposing a timing constraint on system design, implementing fault tolerance
on the MicroBlaze BRAM memory system also incurs some costs in program execution
times. Table 3.16 below shows the results of running the Drhystone program on non-
fault tolerant (minimal) MicroBlaze and fault tolerant MicroBlaze builds.
Table 3.16: Execution times of 500 Dhrystone loops on MicroBlaze processor with









50 13.251 13.631 2.87
75 8.834 9.087 2.86
100 6.625 6.815 2.87
125 10.600 N/A N/A
The fault tolerant execution slow down is not large, but designers must consider
it when calculating algorithm execution time on fault tolerant MicroBlaze systems,
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especially if the program is pushing the limit of the MicroBlaze’s throughput at a
given operating frequency. Execution time for a clock speed of 125 MHz with fault
tolerance enabled was not measured because successful timing closure with any fault
tolerance use case was not achieved at 125 MHz.
3.3.4 Software Scrubbing
To ensure bit errors do not accumulate in BRAMs, Xilinx recommends periodic mem-
ory scrubbing. The Xilinx standalone Board Support Package (BSP) provides the
function microblaze scrub() to perform scrubbing of the entire LMB BRAM and all
MicroBlaze internal BRAMs used in a particular configuration. This function is in-
tended to be called periodically from a timer interrupt routine. During a scrub,
software cyclically reads and writes all addresses, thus correcting any single bit errors
in memory at each address. [96]
Calculating Scrubbing Rate
Xilinx provides an approximate equation for determining the frequency at which the






where PW is the probability of an uncorrectable error occurring in a memory word,
BER is the soft error rate for a single BRAM memory bit, and SR is the scrubbing
rate [96].
3.3.5 Processor Watchdog
To provide a fallback mechanism in case the softcore processor hangs during operation,
the designer may add a watchdog timer module to the processor system. Xilinx
provides such a hardware IP core in the form of a 32-bit peripheral providing a 32-bit
free-running timebase and watchdog timer (WDT) [91]. This watchdog timer IP core
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is distinct from the Virtex-5 configuration watchdog timer hardware module, which
restarts the FPGA configuration process in the event of configuration failure [13].
The Xilinx WDT peripheral uses a dual-expiration architecture, as depicted in
Figure 3-16. After one expiration of the timeout interval, the WDT generates an
interrupt to an interrupt controller module and sets the WDT state bit to ‘1’ in
the status register. If user software does not clear the state bit before the next
expiration of the timeout interval, the WDT triggers a processor system reset. The
WDT peripheral also has a single bit in its control register to indicate whether or
not a watchdog reset signal was asserted. A system reset does not clear this bit,
enabling user software to read it after a processor system reset and determine if a
WDT timeout caused the reset. The user software can then write a ‘1’ to the WDT
state bit to clear the reset status. User software only can disable the WDT by writing
to two distinct addresses, reducing the possibility of inadvertently disabling the WDT
in the application code. [91]
Figure 3-16: Processor system watchdog timer state transition diagram [91]
A general strategy for applying the processor system WDT to a space-based em-
bedded system would design user software to read the reset status bit of the watchdog
timer after each reset of the processor system. Following the read, software may gen-
erate a telemetry packet including the status of the reset bit, which is useful for
ground debugging purposes and tracking radiation effects.
Adding a WDT IP core to a MicroBlaze system requires connecting its reset
output to the PSRM IP core, as shown in Figure 3-17. To utilize the interrupts
the WDT offers, an interrupt controller is added to the system. Table 3.17 provides
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Figure 3-17: MicroBlaze system used to measure resource use of watchdog timer
measurements of the resource and power utilization for different MicroBlaze system
build and fault tolerance options when including WDT and Interrupt Controller IP
cores. The results in Table 3.17 indicate the addition of a WDT with Interrupt
Controller costs few flip flops and LUTs and results in a nearly insignificant increase
in estimated power consumption.
Table 3.17: Resource utilization comparison for MicroBlaze with and without watch-
dog timer and interrupt controller
Fault Tolerance Use Case
Resource None None None Minimal
WDT Present No Yes Yes Yes
Interrupt Controller Present No No Yes Yes
Slice Registers 1528(1.00x) 1714(1.12x) 1824(1.19x) 2182(1.43)
Slice LUTs 1822(1.00x) 1974(1.08x) 2115(1.16x) 2513(1.38)
BRAMs 8(1.00x) 8(1.00x) 8(1.00x) 10(1.25x)
DSPs 3(1.00x) 3(1.00x) 3(1.00x) 3(1.00x)
Total Power (W)1 1.622(1.00x) 1.631(1.01) 1.623(1.00) 1.645(1.01)
3.3.6 Multiple MicroBlaze
An additional fault tolerant scheme offered by the versatility and size of SRAM-based
FPGAs is the implementation of multiple softcore processors in a single user design.
Table 3.18 shows resource utilizations for multiple MicroBlaze processors (without
1Power estimated with ambient temperature of 50◦ Celsius
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any fault tolerance) built in single design. The area cost increases by a factor of
approximately 1 for each processor added to the user design. The estimated power
consumption, however, scales by significantly less than a factor of 1 for each processor
added. Table 3.19 shows the additional resource utilization of adding fault tolerance
to the BRAM controllers of the multiple MicroBlaze systems.
Table 3.18: Resource utilization comparison for implementing multiple MicroBlaze
processors in a single design
Number of MicroBlazes
Resource 1 2 3 4
Slice Registers 1528(1.00x) 2903(1.90x) 4238(2.77x) 5573(3.65x)
Slice LUTs 1823(1.00x) 3501(1.92x) 5049(2.77x) 6596(3.62x)
Power Consumption (W) 1.175(1.00x) 1.219(1.04x) 1.267(1.08x) 1.322(1.13x)
Table 3.19: Resource utilization comparison for implementing multiple MicroBlaze
processors with Minimal fault tolerance in a single design
Number of MicroBlazes
Resource 1 2 3 4
Slice Registers 1884(1.00x) 3573(1.90x) 5304(2.82x) 6993(3.71x)
Slice LUTs 2198(1.00x) 4120(1.87x) 6173(2.81x) 8093(3.68x)
Power Consumption (W) 1.195(1.00x) 1.265(1.06x) 1.316(1.10x) 1.376(1.15x)
Given the the power consumption increase is small for each added MicroBlaze,
designing a system with multiple MicroBlazes could prove an attractive option for
robustness and redundancy against radiation-induced errors [60]. Such a system
design would allow designers to experiment with a synthesis of hardware and software
fault tolerance techniques to achieve higher reliability [65].
3.4 Summary and Recommendations
As analyzed and presented in this chapter, space-based system design with RHBD
SRAM-based FPGAs strongly suggests additional design considerations and tech-
niques that are not required for the significant majority of terrestrial designs. These
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considerations include actively monitoring and correcting configuration memory, pro-
tecting user memory with fault tolerant techniques, and adding redundant modules
for non-RadHard modules within the FPGA. Although these additional techniques
and considerations constrain the design space for systems on SRAM-based FPGAs,
considering their implementation is key to designing high reliability embedded sys-
tems for space applications.
For configuration bitstream management and scrubbing, this work recommends
implementation of bitstream scrubbing and SEFI detection, whether in an external
or internal scrubbing scheme. A system designer must weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of each scheme against the required reliability of the FPGA-based sys-
tem and the available system resources. If sufficient power, budget, board area, and
design time are available and the criticality of the system is high, an external con-
figuration manager will provide more functionality for SEU detection and correction
and higher fidelity SEFI monitoring and correction. If the design space is constrained
and/or the system functionality is less critical, internal scrubbing may be employed
to reduce design complexity, power consumption, and board space, while sacrificing
error detection and correction capability.
The recommendations of this work for BRAM use in a design are to include
ECC on each BRAM in the system. Additionally, if the correctness of the data is
crucial, triplication of each BRAM block along with memory scrubbing should be
implemented. The designer must then factor in the decrease in maximum BRAM
frequency and increase in area and power cost associated with increased reliability.
For designs requiring clock frequencies in addition to those provided by external
oscillators, which PLLs and DCMs are typically used to generate, this work recom-
mends adding an error monitoring unit to each DCM and PLL or adding redundant
PLLs and DCMs to support each DCM and PLL used in a design. If the output
of the clock module must remain constantly accurate, then designers should add re-
dundant clock modules. If, however, the system can tolerate a reset of the clock
module and affected user logic when errors occur in the clock module (e.g. in typical
image processing applications), then an error monitoring scheme may suffice. The
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designer must factor in the additional power consumption increase associated with
adding DCMs and PLLs, as well as the location constraints of the DCM and PLL
blocks on the FPGA die.
For designs using a MicroBlaze softcore processor, this work recommends applying
a fault tolerance use case to the BRAM instruction/data memory system, along with
a processor WDT peripheral. A designer should enable either typical or full fault
tolerant use case and include interrupt controller to facilitate rapid correction of single
bit errors once the LMB BRAM controller detects them. The cost of MicroBlaze fault
tolerance use case implementation is constrained processor system clock speed and
decreased execution time, along with increased flip flop and LUT use in the FPGA
logic structure. Designers must be aware of these limitations and scope the processing




Implementation of Additional Fault
Tolerance on REXIS Instrument
This chapter presents the hardware and software design of the REXIS avionics system
based around a Virtex-5 FPGA, along with the application of several of the fault
tolerant design techniques presented in the previous chapter to the REXIS avionics
system.
4.1 REXIS
The REgolith X-ray Imaging Spectrometer (REXIS) is a student payload on board
NASA’s Origins-Spectral Interpretation-Resource Identification-Security-Regolith Ex-
plorer (OSIRIS-REx) asteroid sample return mission, scheduled for launch in Septem-
ber of 2016. The REXIS project is a collaboration between the MIT Space Systems
Laboratory, the MIT Kavli Institute for Astrophysics and Space Research, and the




The OSIRIS-REx asteroid sample return mission is the third planetary science mission
selected as part of NASA’s New Frontiers Program. The mission is planned to launch
in September 2016 and encounter the asteroid Bennu (formerly 1999 RQ36) in October
2018. Using a variety of imaging payloads, OSIRIS-REx will study Bennu for up
to 505 days in order to globally map the asteroid’s surface from a distance of five
kilometers to a distance of 0.7 kilometers. The primary science goal is to obtain at
least 60 grams of pristine regolith and a surface material sample. Following collection,
the sample will return to Earth in September 2023 in a Stardust-heritage sample
return capsule. The samples will be delivered to the NASA Johnson Space Center
(JSC) curation facility for analysis and world-wide distribution. [2]
Figure 4-1: CAD rendering of OSIRIS-REx spacecraft in the nominal observing and
communication configuration
4.1.2 REXIS Science Mission
REXIS is an x-ray spectrometer designed to use a 2x2 array of charged-coupled devices
(CCDs, totaling four megapixels) to characterize the surface of the Bennu asteroid
both globally and spatially. The CCD-based coded aperture telescope performs re-
mote X-ray Fluorescence (XRF) spectrometry in the soft x-ray band (0.3 keV - 7.5
keV). Elements on the surface of the asteroid absorb x-rays emitted from the sun
and then re-emit, or fluoresce, the x-rays at specific energy levels corresponding to
the element type. The re-emitted x-rays pass through the coded aperture mask of
REXIS and strike the CCDs, from which a combination of analog and digital electron-
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ics measure the charge of each x-ray event. Additionally, REXIS supports a X-ray
Monitor (SXM) subsystem to monitor solar activity during instrument observation
of the asteroid, which provides context for each set of x-ray event measurements.
REXIS contributes to the OSIRIS-REx mission with two science products: (1)
globally measuring the elemental abundances of the asteroid Bennu to classify it
among the major asteroid subgroups, and (2) generating a spatial elemental abun-
dance map of the asteroid’s surface. REXIS science data can provide context to the
sample site selection process to ensure the sample collected is representative of the
entire asteroid surface.
REXIS will achieve the first coded-aperture, wide field imaging for fluorescent
line composition mapping of an asteroid. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s
(JAXA) Hayabusa (MUSES-C) asteroid sample return mission was non-imaging. A
focusing, but smaller field of view, fluorescent mapping instrument will fly on the
joint European Space Agency (ESA) - JAXA BepiColumbo mission to map Mercury.
Figure 4-2: CAD rendering of REXIS instrument, without (left) and with (right) side
shields removed (radiation cover and thermal strap not shown)
4.2 Requirements and Design Factors
This section discusses the high level driving requirements of the REXIS avionics sys-
tem. These requirements, trades, and considerations led to selection of the Xilinx
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Virtex-5QV SRAM-based FPGA as the heart of the REXIS flight avionics system




OSIRIS-REx project requirements specify a 1.5 gigabyte limit on the amount of sci-
ence data REXIS may transmit to the spacecraft for downlink to earth. This limit
prevents the REXIS system from sending complete four megapixel frames to the
spacecraft, as each frame would consist of eight megabytes, limiting the total number
of frames downlinked to less than 200, which is not sufficient for REXIS to produce
an adequate global map of elemental abundance on the asteroid. Thus the REXIS
system must perform some onboard image processing of the pixel data collected from
the CCDs to generate appropriately-sized science data for downlink to earth.
Additionally, science requirements dictate the integration time of collected charge
on the CCID-41s be no more than four seconds to avoid pile up of x-ray events. Pile
up occurs when more than one x-ray event strikes the same pixel on the detector
array, making it difficult to determine if the charge measured for the pixel resulted
from a single x-ray event or multiple x-ray events. Thus, the total time for REXIS
avionics to read a frame from the detector array, process the frame for x-ray events,
and transmit the resulting x-ray event list to the OSIRIS-REx spacecraft must be
less than the four second integration time. Additionally, sufficient slack time must
exist to allow flight software (FSW) to read data from the SXM, perform periodic
housekeeping functions, and process commands from the spacecraft.
Detector Electronics
The MIT Kavli Institute for Astrophysics and Space Research provides the Detec-
tor Electronics (DE) that control the readout of the CCID-41 detectors. The DE
implements a Camera Link interface to output the voltage measured on each pixel
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of the CCDs, which operates at a base frequency of 30 MHz and a “7x clock” (bit
frequency) of 210 MHz, facilitating data transfer at up to 686 MBytes/sec. A de-
tailed description of the Detector Electronics interface appears in Appendix A. An
FPGA provides the most straightforward solution to read in the pixel data from
CCDs through the Detector Electronics and then store the pixel values in memory
for future image processing.
Based on REXIS science goals and mission operating constraints the REXIS avion-
ics system high level requirements are:
• provide digital interface to spacecraft for command processing and telemetry
transmission
• provide control and measurement of the CCID-41 detectors
• provide control and measurement of the SXM
• provide onboard image processing of x-ray events
• maintain functionality in interplanetary radiation environment
• meet power, mass, cost, and radiation hardness requirements
4.2.2 Selection of Virtex-5QV
Interface and image processing requirements led the REXIS team to choose an FPGA
for the avionics system. Because SRAM-based FPGAs are reconfigurable instead of
OTP, they offer a less restrictive and more forgiving design flow, which is ideal for a
student team. A reconfigurable FPGA also provides a versatile testbed for evaluat-
ing different logic designs and softcore processor implementations, including different
system and subsystem clock speeds, different memory sizes, and power consumption.
The flexibility of design flow is a primary reason the REXIS team chose an SRAM-
based FPGA for the avionics system. SRAM-based FPGAs also provide the option of
on-orbit reconfigurability, which was a desired feature of the REXIS avionics system.
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Radiation-hardness requirements from the OSIRIS-REx project motivated the
REXIS team to limit the possible FPGA choices to space grade FPGAs. The two
currently available space grade SRAM-based FPGAs are the Xilinx Virtex-4QV and
the Virtex-5QV. The Virtex-4QV it classified as radiation tolerant [9], and uses the
same mask and circuitry as a particular revision of the commercial Virtex-4 [83].
The Virtex-5QV, however, uses extensive RHBD features, as listed in Table 2.5, and
testing has shown these features to be much more effective at mitigating radiation-
induced effects than the older Virtex-IIQV and Virtex-4QV (see Table 2.8). The
combination of the need for an FPGA, project-level radiation-hardness requirements,
and the RHBD nature of the Virtex-5QV led the REXIS team to the Virtex-5QV for
the avionics subsystem.
4.2.3 Development Process
The REXIS instrument development and testing process is separated into the en-
gineering model (EM) phase and flight the model (FM) phase. The REXIS team
has designed the Engineering Model to be as flight-like as possible to facilitate high
fidelity science data collection testing, spacecraft interface testing, thermal cycle test-
ing, and mechanical/structural integrity and vibration testing. This chapter primarily
documents the avionics Engineering Model system, which is designed to use proto-
type, engineering, or industrial versions of the RadHard electrical components that
will serve on the REXIS Flight Model. The Engineering Model avionics system is
designed around the industrial grade Virtex-5FX130T, and thus much of the devel-
opment work involving FPGA hardware modules and softcore processor design was
accomplished with the commercial Virtex-5FX70T and Virtex-5FX130T.
4.3 MicroBlaze and Hardware Interfaces
A MicroBlaze softcore processor serves as the command and data handler (CDH) for
REXIS, running on an industrial grade Virtex-5FX130T for the EM and on a Virtex-
5QV for the FM. To support the MicroBlaze and meet requirements, the avionics
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design uses several Xilinx IP cores along with several custom hardware modules to
implement interfaces to devices external to the Virtex-5. Each of the IP cores and
custom hardware modules communicates to the MicroBlaze processor through the
Processor Local Bus (PLB), allowing FSW to read status information and write
commands. Figure 4-3 shows the Xilinx IP cores and the custom hardware modules
used in the Virtex-5 design, along with their connections to components on the REXIS
Main Electronics Board (MEB) and to external components located elsewhere on the
REXIS instrument. In Figure 4-3, Xilinx IP cores appear in yellow, and custom
hardware modules and configuration logic appear in green, along with interfaces to
external components.
Figure 4-3: REXIS avionics system block diagram showing internal FPGA hardware
modules
Table 4.1 lists each interface type to external components in the REXIS system.
Each of these interfaces levies certain requirements on the system clock speed and
instruction/data memory size, both of which are constrained by the MicroBlaze fault





Table 4.1: REXIS hardware interfaces
System Device/Hardware Interface
Avionics
Flash Memory BPI Up
SDRAM MPMC
Thermal Temp Sensors ADC Input
Structures Frangibolt Actuator GPIO1
Spacecraft Interface
RS422 Transceivers (x2) UART
Time Tick (x2) GPIO
Side Select (x2) GPIO
Power
Voltage Sensors (x8) ADC Input




Actel FPGA, Camera Link Custom Hardware
Solar X-ray Monitor




4.3.1 Configuration Memory and Non-Volatile Storage
An Aeroflex 64-Mbit NOR flash memory unit stores the configuration bitstream for
the Virtex-5. The Virtex-5 configuration hardware uses the Byte Peripheral Interface
(BPI) Up configuration mode to read 16-bit words from the NOR Flash during con-
figuration. Indirect BPI programming through the Virtex-5 facilitates writing of the
bitstream onto the NOR Flash before it is used to configure the Virtex-5 [82].
Because the Virtex-5 configuration bitstream is approximately 50-Mbits (6.25
MBytes) in size, FSW uses the remaining 14-Mbits (1.75 MBytes) of space for non-
volatile data and housekeeping information storage. A pull-up resistor sets the Write
Protect signal high on the NOR Flash to avoid inadvertent writes to the non-volatile
memory, thus requiring FSW to explicitly lower the FPGA output pin in order to
write to non-volatile memory. Software restrictions will prohibit FSW from writing
addresses in the first 50-Mbit of memory space in order to protect the FPGA config-
uration bitstream if it should be needed to reconfigure the Virtex-5 after a power-on
reset commanded by the spacecraft.
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4.3.2 Volatile Memory
An 3D-Plus 1-Gbit Double Data Rate (DDR) Synchronous Dynamic Random Access
Memory (SDRAM) provides volatile memory storage for the REXIS avionics sys-
tem. Xilinx’s MPMC provides the read/write interface to the MicroBlaze processor,
accessing the SDRAM at 100 MHz and responding to read/write requests from the
MicroBlaze at the processor system clock frequency.
The volatile memory stores the following structures for image processing: the bias
map, the current frame, the possible x-ray events list (PXEL), and true x-ray events
list (TXEL). Details of these structures appear in Section 4.4.
4.3.3 Power Management and Distribution System
The REXIS Power Management and Distribution System (PMAD) relies on one Rad-
Hard EMI filter and seven RadHard DC-DC regulators to supply the required voltages
to the REXIS system. Figure 4-4 shows the layout of the primary PMAD system.
The 3.3V, 2.5V, and 1.0V regulators are designed to power up in a set sequence to
ensure proper Virtex-5 power initialization: 1.0V voltage rail first, followed by 2.5V
rail, and finally the 3.3V rail.




The REXIS electrical interface to the OSIRIS-REx spacecraft consists of input power,
asynchronous command and telemetry lines, and discrete time tick and side select
digital signal lines. The OSIRIS-REx avionics system contains two separate CDH
units (referred to as Side A and Side B, respectively) in order to provide a dual-string
redundancy in the spacecraft avionics design. Although only one side of the spacecraft
avionics is active at any one time, REXIS supports hardware interfaces to both Side
A and Side B.
Asynchronous Command/Telemetry The command and telemetry interface
to the OSIRIS-REx spacecraft is implemented according to the RS422 standard using
the UART protocol. Two UART hardware modules implemented in the Virtex-5
facilitate communication with the spacecraft via RadHard Intersil RS422 transceivers.
When data from the spacecraft appears on either of the command lines, the UART
modules generate interrupt signals to the Interrupt Controller IP core, which prompts
FSW to process the commands.
Discrete Time Tick and Side Select Each spacecraft CDH side provides a
time tick signal as a method to synchronize the REXIS instrument clock to the space-
craft clock, as well as a side select signal indicating whether or not the spacecraft CDH
side is active. Four Xilinx General Purpose Input/Output (GPIO) IP cores imple-
mented in the Virtex-5 monitor the time tick and side select signals via a RadHard
Avago optocoupler. When a rising or falling edge occurs on either of the time tick
signal lines, the GPIO modules produce an interrupt to the Interrupt Controller IP
core, which signals FSW to synchronize the instrument clock based on information
received in a time update message over the command/telemetry interface. When a
rising edge occurs on one of the side select lines, the GPIO triggers an interrupt to
FSW through the Interrupt Controller, resulting in FSW changing the UART module
to which it listens for commands and sends telemetry.
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4.3.5 Detector Electronics Interface
The Detector Electronics (DE) provide the interface to, and control of, the four CCID-
41 detectors in the REXIS detector array. The DE converts the analog signal from
the detectors into a digital signal for storage and image processing and is capable of
controlling up to four CCDs. FSW controls the DE via a UART interface at 115,200
bits/sec. On command from FSW, the DE measure and transmit the pixel values
from the CCID-41 detector array to the Frame Grabber custom hardware module at
30 MHz in the Camera Link format. At the time of this writing, the DE provide
16-bits of energy resolution per CCD pixel measured. Appendix A provides details
of the DE design and operation.
4.3.6 Frame Grabber and Hardware Image Processing
Custom VHDL and Verilog logic designs in the fabric of the Virtex-5 implement the
Frame Grabber module, which receives CCD digital pixel energies from the Detector
Electronics in the Camera Link format and writes them to external SDRAM via an
interface with the MPMC IP core.
Figure 4-5: Frame grabber and image processing control and status registers shown
with MPMC interface to SDRAM memory regions used for image processing
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Figure 4-5 provides an illustration of the connections between the custom frame grab-
ber logic, control registers, MicroBlaze, MPMC, and SDRAM. The Native Port In-
terface (NPI) of the MPMC allows the custom logic to read and write the SDRAM
memory, where it stores the current frame in a specific format to re-create the im-
age in memory as it receives it from the DE. This specific format facilitates simpler
algorithmic access to each pixel in the frame for image processing.
The MicroBlaze processor controls the Frame Grabber and Image Processing cus-
tom hardware modules through 32-bit wide control and status registers accessible via
the PLB. Through a PLB interface to the MPMC, the MicroBlaze may also read and
write values in SDRAM, allowing it to perform event grading on x-ray events. The
final x-ray event list for transmission to the spacecraft as science data is stored in
MicroBlaze BRAM data memory.
4.3.7 Solar X-ray Monitor Interface
The Solar X-ray Monitor (SXM) provides solar x-ray activity calibration data for
the REXIS instrument. A block diagram appears in Figure 4-6, and Appendix B
provides details of the SXM design. Similar to the frame grabber and image processing
modules, the MicroBlaze controls and reads data from the SXM custom interface
hardware via a set of 32-bit wide control, status, and data registers accessible via the
PLB.
Figure 4-6: Solar X-ray Monitor Functional Diagram
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The SXM custom hardware module provides 320 energy bins of 32 bits each to
record the number of events detected in each energy bin during the histogram update
period (i.e. integration time of the SXM). FSW reads values in the energy bins to
create a histogram of event energies at a configurable rate (baseline of once every 100
seconds), and then generates an SXM histogram science packet for transmission to
the spacecraft.
4.3.8 Frangibolt Actuation Circuit
The Frangibolt radiation release cover mechanism controlled by the Frangibolt ac-
tuation circuit provides the capability to open the radiation cover protecting the
CCID-41 detectors during the cruise phase of the REXIS mission. A RadHard M.S.
Kennedy MSK5055RH switching regulator controller along with two external Rad-
Hard n-channel MOSFETs and supporting components switch the spacecraft bus
voltage down to 9VDC to supply power to the Frangibolt actuator during actuation.
REXIS FSW controls a dedicated GPIO IP core, the output of which is connected to
the enable pin on the MSK5055RH controller.
4.3.9 Housekeeping
A RadHard Texas Instruments 12-bit ADC with a built-in 8:1 multiplexer provides
voltage measurement capability for system monitoring and housekeeping data collec-
tion. Housekeeping values include temperature readings from platinum temperature
resistors (PRTs) and the voltage of each voltage rail in the REXIS PMAD system.
The MicroBlaze communicates with the ADC via a Xilinx SPI interface IP core.
4.4 Image Processing
This section details the onboard image processing of CCD data for x-ray events per-
formed by the avionics system. Image processing requirements drive the required sys-
tem clock frequency and MicroBlaze instruction/data memory space, both of which
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are affected by the MicroBlaze fault tolerance use case and implementation. REXIS
image processing consists of several steps performed on each frame readout from the
CCDs: bias subtraction, event finding, and energy summing and event grading. Ad-
ditionally, FSW performs bias map generation at the start of each science run (each
time REXIS FSW enters image processing mode).
4.4.1 Algorithm Heritage
The REXIS image processing algorithms draw on experience from the Advanced
Satellite for Cosmology and Astrophysics (ASCA) x-ray imaging mission, Advanced
CCD Imaging Spectrometer (ACIS) x-ray imaging payload, and Suzaku (ASTRO E)
x-ray imaging spectrometer mission. More background and detail of these designs
appear in Appendix A.
4.4.2 Bias Map Generation
Based on experience from the ASCA, ACIS, and Suzaku missions, distinguishing X-
ray events within a CCD pixel from background noise requires knowledge of the pixel
energy value the analog charge readout electronics on the DE would measure in the
absence of any event or background–this quantity is known as the pixel’s ”bias level”
[77]. To facilitate this determination, an array of bias levels known as the bias map
is stored in memory, which the imaging system must subtract from the incoming
data pixels prior to any further image processing [39]. Bias subtraction also removes
inherent noise from each frame–this noise characteristic is unique to each of the four
nodes of each CCID-41 detector and the associated DE readout electronics for each
node.
At the beginning of each REXIS science run (each time REXIS FSW enters image
processing mode), FSW generates a bias map from multiple frames collected from
the CCID-41 detector array. First, FSW takes a series of bias conditioning frames
in order to measure an estimated base bias level for each pixel in the detector array.
Then FSW selectively averages pixel values from approximately 12 frames, pixel by
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pixel, to generate the bias map array. FSW and the Frame Grabber hardware module
store the eight megabyte bias map in external SDRAM.
4.4.3 Bias Subtraction and Event Finding
After bias map generation is complete, FSW performs bias subtraction and event
finding for each frame readout from the CCID-41 detectors while in image processing
mode. Once the Frame Grabber hardware module has completed frame capture,
FSW starts the Image Processing hardware module via a control register write. The
Image Processing module then subtracts each bias map pixel value stored in SDRAM
from the corresponding current frame pixel value. After bias subtraction, if the
current frame pixel value is above the event threshold (ET), the Image Processing
module records its memory address in the possible x-ray events list (PXEL). Once bias
subtraction and event finding are complete, the image processing module generates
an interrupt through the Interrupt Controller IP core to signal FSW.
Testing of the bias subtraction and event finding algorithm with software and
hardware implementations demonstrated the advantages of employing FPGA hard-
ware for these algorithms, as shown below in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Comparison of Bias Subtraction and Event Finding Times for Software
and Hardware Implementations
Implementation Execution Time (s)
Software 3.1
Hardware 1.2
The custom-designed Image Processing hardware module implemented in VHDL/Verilog
clocked at 125 MHz performed 2.5 times faster than a C-based implementation on
the MicroBlaze processor clocked at 125 MHz. In this comparison, both the hardware
Image Processing module and MicroBlaze software implementation used the MPMC
interface to external DDR2 SDRAM at 125 MHz on the Xilinx ML507 development
platform. Each case was executed on the Virtex-5FX70T on the ML507 development
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board using a four megapixel image stored in DDR2 SDRAM with 4000 simulated
x-ray events placed in the image prior to bias subtraction and event finding.
4.4.4 Energy Summing and Event Grading
After the Image Processing module identifies possible x-ray events in the current
frame, FSW performs energy summing and event grading to produce the true x-
ray event list (TXEL) which eventually (after possible selective low energy filtering)
constitutes REXIS primary science data. Event grading is used because x-ray photons
may deposit charge in more than one pixel when striking the detector arrays, and
this approach is based on image processing techniques used on the ASCA, ACIS, and
Suzaku systems. FSW sums and grades each possible event in the PXEL by means
of examining a 3x3 pixel grid surrounding each pixel energy in the PXEL. Figure 4-7
shows the 3x3 grid of eight pixels surrounding the center pixel (possible x-ray event
with energy above the event threshold), which is colored green and labeled “(i,j)”.
Once energy summing and event grading are complete, FSW writes the pixel’s (x,y)
location on the detector array, total energy, and event grade to the True X-ray Events
List (TXEL), with which FSW may perform selective low energy filtering based on
the total number of true x-ray events detected.
Figure 4-7: 3x3 pixel grid used for event grading
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Energy Summing
If the pixel energy is a local maximum with respect to the energies of the eight
surrounding pixels in the 3x3 grid, then FSW performs energy summing. If the energy
of each pixel in the 3x3 grid exceeds the split-threshold (ST, sometimes known as the
secondary threshold), FSW adds is energy to the energy of the center pixel (the center
pixel being above the primary event threshold), thus creating a summation of total
event energy. The ST is configurable in software by command.
ASCA Event Grading
To provide information on the distribution of x-ray event energy within the 3x3 pixel
grid, FSW performs an event grading function based on the same technique used on
the ASCA mission. As shown in Figure 4-8, each pixel in the 3x3 grid surrounding
the center pixel (grade 0) is assigned a distinct power of two. If the energy in a pixel
is above the split threshold, then FSW adds its corresponding event grade value to
the grade for the event. For example, if all eight pixels surrounding the center pixel
contain energies above the ST, then the event is a grade 255. If only the north pixel
directly above the center pixel contains an energy above the ST, then the event is
grade 64. Thus, the geometric arrangement of pixels exceeding the ST determines
the grade code [39].
Figure 4-8: ASCA 3x3 grading model for an X-ray event [15]
The event grading algorithm also rejects cosmic rays at this time through a com-
bination of high energy rejection and rejection of certain patterns of charge collection
(the grade code) [39] from the TXEL. Cosmic rays have energies on the order of
MeV, much higher than the 0.5 keV to 8 keV range of x-ray photon energies REXIS
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is designed to measure.
Low Energy Filter
As mentioned previously, REXIS has a limited science data budget for instrument
housekeeping and science data downlinked to earth. Based on the data budget and
the amount of operational time allotted to REXIS during the mission, FSW may send
a maximum of 200 x-ray events per frame. If the Image Processing Module detects
more than 200 events, FSW implements a selective low energy filter to trim the TXEL
down to a final event list to 200 events before sending the event list to the spacecraft.
4.4.5 Image Processing Testing
This section provides a brief overview of frame grabbing and image processing testing
the REXIS team conducted with CCID-41 detectors under irradiation from an Iron-
55 soft x-ray calibration source. The test setup consisted of the REXIS Virtex-5
design running on a Xilinx ML507 development board with a Camera Link interface
to the prototype DE, which were connected to two CCID-41s in a thermal vacuum
chamber (TVAC). Testing of the REXIS image processing system with live CCID-41
detectors has demonstrated the importance of bias subtraction in the image processing
algorithms.
Figure 4-9: ds9 visualization of pixels on CCID-41 detector under Iron-55 irradiation
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The detector temperature during this test was approximately -70◦ Celsius, which
prevents dark current from adding noise to the measurements. As noted previously,
each analog electronics chain that measures charge from each of the CCD output nodes
has a characteristic noise level different from the other chains. Additionally, each
node of the CCID-41 has slightly different readout characteristics, which are visibly
apparent in Figure 4-9. The color scheme in Figure 4-9 uses histogram equalization,
making x-ray events appear white against the darker background of non-event pixels
in each node.
(a) X-ray events histogram without bias sub-
traction
(b) X-ray events histogram with bias subtrac-
tion
Figure 4-10: Comparison of X-ray histogram with and without bias map subtraction
performed prior to event grading
Figure 4-10a shows a histogram generated by the REXIS event grading algorithm
on the frame shown in Figure 4-9 without including bias subtraction prior to event
grading. The primary energy line of Iron-55 at 5.9 keV is visible as the largest peak
in the histogram, however, the secondary energy line at 6.3 keV is not definitively
distinguishable amongst the many secondary energy lines to the right of the 5.9 keV
line.
In contrast, Figure 4-10b shows a histogram generated by the REXIS event grading
algorithm on the frame shown in Figure 4-9 with bias subtraction performed prior
to event grading. The primary energy line at 5.9 keV is better defined and the
secondary peak is more distinctly grouped around 6.3 keV than in the histogram
generated without bias subtraction.
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4.5 Flight Software
This section briefly outlines the design and operation of the REXIS Flight Software
(FSW). REXIS FSW does not use an operating system, but instead relies on a single
thread, non-preemptible structure based around the four second integration time of
the CCD detectors, which FSW nomenclature refers to as the four second image
processing loop.
4.5.1 Operating States
REXIS FSW operates in one of two states: safe mode or image processing mode. In
safe mode, FSW sends aliveness messages to the spacecraft once every four seconds,
and housekeeping packets once every minute, but does not perform any science data
acquisition or processing. In image processing mode, FSW performs CCD data ac-
quisition and processing, sending CCD event list packets to the spacecraft once every
four seconds as dictated by the image processing loop. Additionally, FSW reads and
transmits SXM histogram packets once every 100 seconds and housekeeping packets
once every minute. Figure 4-11 provides a simplified state transition diagram for
FSW operating states.
Figure 4-11: Simplified REXIS FSW state transition diagram
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REXIS Image Processing Loop
While in image processing mode, FSW steps through the image processing loop once
every four seconds based on the required maximum allowable integration time of the
CCD detectors, which is four seconds. During the loop, FSW executes each of the
steps described in Section 4.4: bias subtraction, event finding, energy summing and
event grading, and selective low energy filtering (if necessary), followed by transmis-
sion of the final x-ray event list to the spacecraft. A hardware Timer IP core provides
interrupts to FSW once every four seconds to initiate entry into the loop. Successful
and timely execution of the image processing loop is essential to ensuring REXIS
provides sufficient science data production to map the surface of the asteroid Bennu.
4.6 Fault Tolerant Design Application
4.6.1 Configuration Monitoring
As discussed in Chapter 3, configuration monitoring is a desirable feature for a SRAM-
based FPGA operating in a space environment, even a RHBD model. In considering
what monitoring scheme to apply in the REXIS avionics system, the REXIS team
did not opt for an external configuration monitor due to the associated increases in
design complexity, interface complexity, required PCB area, power, and cost. Addi-
tionally, the REXIS instrument can rely can rely on the OSIRIS-REx spacecraft as
a psuedo watchdog for instrument aliveness and correct functionality. If the REXIS
MicroBlaze suffers a major functional error due to an SEU, then the spacecraft FSW
can reset REXIS by removing power and then reapplying power, which will cause a
reconfiguration of the Virtex-5 and clear the error.
An internal configuration monitoring and scrubbing scheme proved more attractive
to the REXIS design Although not yet implemented in the REXIS Virtex-5 system
at the time of this writing, The REXIS avionics team plans to add a version of the
Virtex-5 SEU controller discussed in 3 into the REXIS design. One possibility would
be to include the SEU controller outside the EDK platform studio project (which
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contains the MicroBlaze and supporting peripherals). In this scheme, the MicroBlaze
would communicate to the SEU controller via a UART IP core connected to the SEU
controller’s UART control/status lines. This approach could prove simple because
the SEU controller can be treated as a black box with defined commands and output
data as presented in Chapman’s application note [33]. Another option is to modify
the SEU controller to incorporate it as a semi-custom hardware module that connects
to the MicroBlaze PLB.
4.6.2 MicroBlaze Fault Tolerance
The REXIS avionics design stores instruction/data memory for FSW in Virtex-5
BRAM, which is the most vulnerable non-RHBD special function hardware module in
the Virtex-5QV. The REXIS team plans to implement the typical fault tolerance use
case in the MicroBlaze system to facilitate generation of an interrupt if the instruction
or data LMB controllers detect errors in BRAM. The Flight Model of the MicroBlaze
system will not employ the full fault tolerance use case to avoid the possibility of
inadvertently writing incorrect data into memory using the fault injection registers.
However, the team may employ the full use case for fault response handling and
characterization during development with the Engineering Model.
As anticipated by the analysis and results presented in Chapter 3, applying addi-
tional fault tolerant design techniques to the REXIS MicroBlaze system constrains the
design. Restrictions on the MicroBlaze instruction/data memory size and MicroB-
laze processor system clock speed are the primary effects of applying fault tolerance
to the REXIS design, the implications of which are restricted code size and slower
execution times for software tasks, respectively. This section details these effects and
their impact on the REXIS architecture.
Based on the REXIS FSW architecture design, FSW must perform all required
functions within the four second image processing loop time. To mitigate SEU upsets
in the instruction/data stored in BRAM, REXIS will employ a fault tolerance use
case in the MicroBlaze system, which will require a slower clock frequency resulting
in slower execution times for REXIS FSW. To characterize the effects of slowing the
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processor clock frequency to accommodate a MicroBlaze fault tolerance use case, the
execution times of energy summing and event grading and required FSW tasks were
measured using the Virtex-5FX70T on the Xilinx ML507 development board. Table
4.3 provides a characterization of the increase in execution time for energy summing
and event grading algorithms (as described in Section 4.4) running with a 62.5 MHz
processor frequency as compared to a 125 MHz processor frequency.
Table 4.3: Energy summing and Event grading execution time on simulated x-ray













Processor system clock frequencies of 62.5 MHz and 125 MHz were the selected
frequencies for comparison due to limitations on the DDR2 SDRAM interface clock
frequency on the ML507 development board. The Xilinx EDK enforces a 1:1 or 1:2
ratio between the processor system clock frequency and the MPMC-external memory
interface clock frequency, and the lowest MPMC-external memory interface clock fre-
quency for the DDR2 SDRAM on the ML507 is 125 MHz. To provide an appropriate
basis for execution time comparison between different processor clock frequencies, the
MPMC-external memory clock frequency should remain constant. Given the DDR2
SRAM and MPMC restrictions, processor system clock frequencies of 62.5 MHz and
125 MHz are the available options for comparison. Since the REXIS system will use
DDR SDRAM capable of operating at slower frequencies, slower processor system
clock frequencies will be available for consideration in the final REXIS design.
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Table 4.4 shows the measured execution times for required FSW tasks that must
execute within the four second imaging loop. Due to the status of FSW builds at
the time of this writing, fault/error handling and checksum generation/validation
execution times are not included in Table 4.4. The execution time for transmission
of housekeeping, SXM histogram, and CCD event list packets does not include the
UART transmit interrupt handling time. However, the execution times for these tasks
is not expected to increase significantly the total execution time for all required tasks.
Table 4.4: Execution time in ms for FSW tasks at different processor system clock
frequencies with 125 MHz SDRAM interface clock speed
FSW Task 62.5 MHz (ms) 125 MHz (ms)
Process Command 0.295 0.174
Housekeeping 0.579 0.287
Housekeeping TX 0.18 0.37
SXM Histogram 0.329 0.160
SXM Histogram TX 0.048 0.020
CCD Event Energy Sum & Grade 28.4 14.07
CCD Event List TX 0.134 0.066
Total 29.97 15.147
The results in Table 4.4 demonstrate the REXIS system can execute required FSW
tasks within the four second image processing loop time with substantial margin, even
with a reduced processor clock frequency resulting from implementation with a Mi-
croBlaze fault tolerance use case. The total FSW task execution time is small relative
to the four second imaging loop time primarily because the Image Processing cus-
tom hardware module implementation frees FSW from performing the time-intensive
tasks of the event finding and bias subtraction algorithms (see Table 4.2). If other
design and system constraints dictated the event finding and bias subtraction func-
tions execute in software, the system might fail to meet the four second imaging loop
requirement as a result of a slower processor clock frequency.
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4.7 Conclusion
The REXIS avionics system provides a case study of the effects of applying additional
fault tolerance to a system designed for implementation on a RHBD SRAM-based
FPGA and initially for implementation on a commerical SRAM-based FPGA. These
effects can be critical to ensuring the FPGA system design functions correctly and
meets time-based processing requirements, especially in a design centered around a
softcore processor. Beginning a system design and trade space exploration with these
effects and constraints in mind can save designers significant time as well as improve




Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis began with a literature review of radiation effects on FPGAs, FPGA
radiation testing and effects prediction, and an overview of the RHBD SRAM-based
Virtex-5QV to provide a foundation for the primary contributions of this work. It then
identified the additional design techniques designers should use when implementing a
system based around a RHBD SRAM-based FPGA. The additional design techniques
focus on configuration management and scrubbing, adding fault tolerance to non-
RHBD special function modules, and adding fault tolerance to MicroBlaze softcore
processor system designs. This work also quantified the cost of implementing the
techniques and provided a list of recommendations toward their implementation in
system design.
For configuration management, this work detailed the advantages and disadvan-
tages of external scrubbing schemes and internal scrubbing schemes, as well as ana-
lyzing several published external schemes and internal schemes. For special function
hardware modules, this thesis quantified the area and power cost of adding additional
hardware modules to incorporate fault tolerance through redundancy. For softcore
processor use, this work quantified the frequency and internal BRAM constraints
imposed by adding fault tolerance use cases to the MicroBlaze softcore processor.
This thesis also demonstrated the implementation of several of the additional de-
sign techniques on the REXIS instrument avionics system as a case study. The nexus
of real world requirements and constraints such as spacecraft-to-payload interfaces,
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component radiation hardening requirements, and the effect of thermal cycling and
mechanical vibration on avionics design choices (to name a only few), with desired
fault tolerance and error mitigation schemes demonstrates how a flight system can
prove more complicated than a lab test bench proof of concept. However, these chal-
lenges make REXIS, and specifically the REXIS avionics system, a worthy research
effort–one from which current and future designers and engineers can learn.
5.1 Future Work
This thesis identified the baseline additional design techniques for use of a RHBD
SRAM-based FPGA, while leaving room for follow-on research and more thorough
exploration of fault tolerant designs with the special function hardware modules of
the Virtex-5QV. One principal area for further work is the creation of a DCM/PLL
error monitoring design along with measurement of its resource consumption and
error detection accuracy and resolution.
In the REXIS design, ECC has been implemented on the BRAM storing the
instruction and data memory of the MicroBlaze. ECC implementation and handling
on the FIFO that transfers pixel values between the Detector Electronics Camera
Link interface and the MPMC interface to SDRAM has yet to be implemented. Also,
ECC on the BRAM in the MPMC interface to the DDR SDRAM has yet to be
implemented. Appropriate handling procedures and functions for errors in each of
these vulnerable BRAMs will require planning and development time, as well as a
proper analysis of their impacts on performance of the frame grabber and image
processing functions.
Apropos configuration management and scrubbing, much work remains to fa-
cilitate the integration of some form of the Virtex-5 SEU controller as an internal
configuration manager and scrubber in the REXIS Virtex-5 design. Additionally, a
detailed plan to monitor configuration status via an ICAP module should be devel-
oped along with a set of FSW responses to error signals detected in the status. Such
a plan and implementation on REXIS would provide a higher level of fault tolerance
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to the design while also providing the opportunity to produce interesting on-orbit
statistics of configuration status and internal configuration monitoring performance.
Given the opportunities to implement multiple softcore processors on a single
FPGA design in conjunction with the logic resource and power utilization estimated
in Chapter 3, the possibility of designing the REXIS system with multiple MicroB-
laze processors could open several avenues of research. The trade space available
from a combination of redundant MicroBlaze processors and fault tolerant software
techniques [65] could offer substantially more protection from SEU-induced faults as
compared to using only a single MicroBlaze with an ECC fault tolerance use case
enabled. Triplication of the MicroBlaze instruction/data BRAM system followed by
testing with fault injection also holds the promise of adding additional fault mitiga-
tion to the fault tolerance options already existing in the BRAM controllers, as well
as providing an area ripe for research.
An early driver of the selection of the Virtex-5QV for the REXIS instrument was
the opportunity to employ reconfiguration on-orbit. This possibility was attractive
to the system design team in the early phases of the project, before the team com-
pletely understood the details of system implementation with an SRAM-based FPGA.
On-orbit reconfiguration likely requires either an external configuration monitor or
partial reconfiguration, and each of these options comes with a cost. The team did
not opt for an external configuration monitor due to the associated increases in design
complexity, interface complexity, required PCB area, power, and cost. Thus, partial
reconfiguration is an option for the REXIS design. Implementing partial reconfigura-
tion in the REXIS system and studying how to apply fault tolerance to increase its




CCDs and Detector Electronics
This appendix reviews the basic functionality of CCDs as scientific instruments, the
basic structure and capabilities of the CCID-41 detector, and the functionality of the
TESS prototype Detector Electronics.
A.1 Charge Coupled Devices
A.1.1 CCD Operation
CCDs function similarly to proportional counters, in that individual photons striking
a CCD photoelectrically liberate a number of electrons roughly proportional to the
x-ray photon energy [58]. The generated electrons (charge) are stored in the depletion
region of a metal-oxide-semiconductor (MOS) capacitor, which are placed very close
together in the CCD array [52]. Controlling readout electronics move the charges in
the CCD circuit by manipulating the voltages on the gates of the capacitors so as
to allow the charge to spill from one capacitor to the next. Thus the name “charge-
coupled” device [52].
In the three-phase CCD, such as the CCID-41, the gates are arranged in parallel,
and every third gate is connected to the same clock driver signal. The basic cell in
the CCD, which corresponds to one pixel, consists of a triplet of these gates, each
separately connected to phase-1, phase-2 and phase-3 clocks making up a pixel register
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[52]. Figure A-1 is a diagram of a three-phase CCD, showing the orientation of both
the vertical (parallel) and horizontal (serial) registers.
Figure A-1: Primary components of a three-phase CCD [52]
A CCD image is read out by a succession of vertical shifts through the vertical
registers, or parallel registers. For each vertical shift, a line of pixels is transferred
into a horizontal, or serial, register which is oriented perpendicular to the parallels.
Before the next line is shifted, the charge in the serial register is transferred to the
output amplifier (video chain the case of the Detector Electronics), which converts
the charge contained in each pixel to a voltage. Readout electronics serially read
out the device line-by-line, pixel-by-pixel, creating a representation of the scene of
photons incident on the device. [52]
Ideally, the charge from a single x-ray photon would be confined to a single pixel
(referred to as the target pixel), and the surrounding pixels would contain no charge.
In practice, the photon is sometimes absorbed below the CCD’s depletion layer, in a
field-free region. Charge generated there diffuses into neighboring pixels, an indicator
of degraded charge collection efficiency(CCE) performance. Also, imperfect charge
transfer causes some of the charge from the target pixel to ”lag” during successive
transfers so that an x-ray event exhibits a ”tail” of deferred charge. The size and
shape of this tail is an indicator of charge transfer efficiency (CTE) performance. [52]
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A.1.2 Iron-55 Calibration
Iron-55 is a standard soft x-ray source for CCD calibration. An Iron-55 atom is
inherently unstable and decays into a Manganese atom when its nucleus quantum
mechanically absorbs a K-Shell electron (half-life is 2.7 years). An electron generates
an x-ray when it drops from either the L-shell or the M-shell to fill the newly vacant K-
shell. This action produces either a Kα (5.9 keV) or a Kβ (6.3 keV) x-ray, respectively.
The production of an alpha x-ray is 7 times more likely than a beta x-ray [52].
Additionally, a 5.9 keV photon generates 1620 electrons in the CCD, resulting in a
conversion factor of 3.65 eV per electron.
A.2 Mission Heritage
A.2.1 ASCA
The Advanced Satellite for Cosmology and Astrophysics (ASCA, formerly Astro-D)
was Japan’s fourth cosmic x-ray astronomy mission, and the second for which the
United States provided part of the scientific payload [12].
Figure A-2: Artist’s rendering of the ASCA spacecraft [12]
ASCA carried two Solid-state Imaging Spectrometers (SIS), the hardware for which
was supplied as a joint effort by MIT, the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science
(ISAS), and Osaka University [6]. The SIS units on ASCA represent the first suc-
cessful space flight use of X-ray CCDs as photon counting and spectroscopic imagers.
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The SIS observed x-rays in the energy range of 0.4 keV to 10 keV, with a resolution
of two percent at 5.9 keV (Iron-55 Kα line), using Lincoln Lab CCID7s [58].
Figure A-3: Drawing of ASCA spacecraft with major components labeled [58]
ASCA operated successfully for seven years until attitude control was lost on 14
July 2000. After completing its mission, ASCA reentered the atmosphere on 2 March
2001.
ASCA used 54HC series logic chips to control the readout of the CCDs, CS5012
ADCs to measure the charge accumulated in each pixel, and a Fujitsu digital signal
processor for video processing. Energy consumption for the readout electronics was
approximately 65 µJ/pixel.
A.2.2 ACIS
The Advanced CCID Imaging Spectrometer (ACIS) launched aboard the Chandra
X-ray observatory (CXO) on July 23, 1999. The CXO is designed for high resolution
( 1/2 arcsec) X-ray imaging and spectroscopy. The ACIS imaging system consists of
ten CCDs, four front illuminated (FI) arranged in a square configuarion and six in
a linear array [39]. At the time of this writing, ACIS continues to operate on-orbit
aboard Chandra, providing scientific data. FigureA-4 is an artist’s rendering of the
CXO spacecraft.
The ACIS parallel clocks shift charge from row to row in 40 µs, which is four
times the pixel rate of 10 µs. Approximately 3.2 seconds are required to readout all
of the pixels from the frame store and measure the charge stored in each. Energy
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Figure A-4: Artist’s rendering of the Chandra spacecraft [1]
consumption from sensors to downlinked telemetry was about 25 µJ/pixel for ACIS.
ACIS uses Actel antifuse FPGAs to control the readout of the CCDs, CS5012
ADCs, and a Mongoose processor. The Mongoose is a radiation hardened MIPS
R3000 32-bit microprocessor fabricated on CMOS Silicon-on-Insulator (SOI) [7]. ACIS
electronics shift pixels from the imaging area to the framestore in 41 ms and typically
expose the imaging area for 3.24 seconds [39].
Additionally, analysis of CCD data from the ASCA mission demonstrated the
CCD bias levels changed significantly in a spatially random manner (presumably
resulting from radiation damage). Following this realization, the ACIS team added
bias map generation and bias subtraction capabilities to the ACIS image processing
system [77], both of which are included in the REXIS image processing design.
Figure A-5: Mongoose-V RadHard MIPS processor [7]
A.2.3 Suzaku
Suzaku (formerly Astro-E2) is Japan’s fifth x-ray astronomy mission. The X-ray
Imaging Spectrometer (XIS) consists of both front-illuminated and back-illuminated
CCDs (X-ray Imaging Spectrometer on Suzaku).
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Figure A-6: Artist’s rendering of the Suzaku spacecraft [5]
A.2.4 TESS
The mission of the Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite (TESS) is to locate exoplan-
ets using four Lincoln Laboratory CCID-68 detectors for visible light sensing. At the
time of this writing, NASA selected the TESS program for funding under the Small
Explorer’s program, scheduled for launch in 2017.
The TESS charge sensing circuits will have noisier, lower responsivity, allowing
them to handle relatively large signals, on the order of hundreds of thousands of
electrons per pixel. The maximum signal for TESS will be larger than 200,000 elec-
trons, with a goal of detecting up to 500,000 electrons, while the noise is designed to
be less than 20 electrons per pixel. This yields a dynamic range of 200,000 / 20 =
10,000. TESS requires a higher resolution ADC (at least 16 bits) to provide accurate
measurements and sufficient resolution for science data processing.
The TESS CCD detector array will be 16 megapixels in size, making it four times
the size of the 4 megapixel REXIS CCD detector array. TESS science requirements
dictate frames must be transferred from the detector array once every two seconds,
which is a driving requirement for the TESS DE.
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Figure A-7: Artist’s rendering of the TESS spacecraft [10]
A.3 CCID-41
The section provides an overview of the Lincoln Laboratory CCID-41 detectors used
on the REXIS instrument. The CCID-41 is a back illuminated (BI) CCD, meaning
incident photons enter the back of the device to achieve the highest quantum effi-
ciency possible [52]. The total size of the CCID-41 is 1024 columns of pixels x 1026
rows of pixels, but the bottom two rows (#1205 and #1026) exist to accommodate
misalignment of the light shield used in the CCD mounting assembly . Thus the ac-
tive imaging area of the CCID-41 is 1024 x 1024 pixels. The imaging array is divided
into four “nodes” of 1026 pixels in height x 256 pixels in width each, for a total of
262,656 pixels per node (262,144 active pixels excluding the two bottom rows). Each
serial register (Serial Register AB and Serial Register CD) has 520 pixels total, eight
of which are the four additional pixels (sometimes called underclock pixels) at each
serial register output, thus 256 * 2 = 512, 512 + 8 = 520.
A.3.1 Frame Store
The frame store provides a storage area for the camera electronics to readout the
charge of each pixel in the framestore while the next image is ”integrating” on the
imaging array. The framestore scheme allows the system to operate without a shutter
[39]. Integration time is the amount of time the imaging array is exposed to external
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radiation for charge collection. The CCID-41 frame store is divided into two sections,
each 512 pixels in width by 1026 pixels in height.
A.3.2 Serial Register
Underclocks
As in earlier devices, Each CCID-41 output node includes four extra stages (extended
register pixels) between the first column and the output gate. Image processing
algorithms may use these ”pre-scan” or ”underclock” pixels values as a base reference
for noise levels.
Bidirectional Readout
The serial register allows the controlling electronics to direct charge from two nodes
to two output ports at either end of the register. Due to the bidirectional readout
design, the readout electronics (frame grabber) must reverse the pixel order on two
of the four nodes to reconstruct the image (usually Nodes B and D).
A.3.3 Output Stage
The CCID-41 output stage consists of a single-stage source follower with an off-chip
load resistor that feeds the gate of a U309 which also is to be used in the follower
mode. Both the first-stage load resistor and U309 are placed inside the package next
to the CCD, but user must supply the U309 load resistor outside the package.
A.3.4 Charge Injection
The fundamental enhancement of the CCID-41 from its predecessor CCDs is the addi-
tion of a charge injection register at the top of the imager. This allows the controlling
electronics to inject precise and uniform amounts of charge into each column to mit-
igate the effects of charge-transfer inefficiency, particularly for displacement damage
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from radiation. The TESS DE did not include charge injection circuity at the time
the REXIS avionics team used the TESS DE for development.
A.4 TESS DE
This section presents the design, functionality, and operation of the TESS prototype
Detector Electronics (DE), which the REXIS avionics team used for development
efforts and testing with CCID-47 and CCID-41 detectors. The TESS DE provide
readout control of up to four CCDs, frame transfer via the Camera Link format, and
command/control via a UART interface. The readout electronics use the clamp/dual
slope sampling method (correlated double sampling) to measure charge in each pixel
of the CCD array, with heritage from ACIS on Chandra, the Soft X-ray Camera (SXC)
on the High Energy Transient Explorer (HETE)-2 mission, and XIS on Suzaku. The
TESS DE prototype unit consists of two PCBs: the driver board and the video board.
A.4.1 TESS Requirements
TESS science requirements dictate the readout electronics must readout an entire 16
megapixel frame once every 2 seconds. If the pixel charge measurement and readout
were completed serially, then the pixel readout time would need to be less than or
equal to 119 ns/pixel as shown in Equation A.1.
2 seconds
16 megapixels
= 119 ns/pixel (A.1)
However, the DE has the capability to readout 16 pixels simultaneously because it
contains 16 separate video chains. This parallelization significantly reduces the pixel




A pixel charge measurement period of 1.9 µs is significantly more feasible for
the readout and processing electronics than 119 ns. Based on the decision to use
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the Camera Link standard to output pixels to a frame grabber, 30 MHz is the base
frequency from which the DE operates
Figure A-8 shows a diagram of the major functional blocks on the DE prototype
unit.
Figure A-8: Detector Electronics functional block diagram
A.4.2 Driver Board
The DE driver board houses the Atmel microcontroller (MCU), Actel FPGA, serial
and parallel clock regulators, and capacitor banks for parallel clocking (imaging area
to framestore). Figure A-9 shows the driver PCB.
Figure A-9: Top (left) and bottom (right) sides of TESS prototype Detector Elec-
tronics driver board with major circuit components labeled
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Atmel MCU
The Atmel MCU is the ”brain” of the DE, as it receives commands and passes teleme-
try over the UART interface, controls the clock sequencer implemented on the Actel
FPGA, sets the clock driver signal voltages, and manages housekeeping acquisition.
LSE is used to program and interface with the Atmel MCU.
LSE LSE is a variant of the Forth programming language, first developed in
1802 machine language by Bob Goeke at MIT. Scientists and engineers in the MIT
CCD lab were its main users. The version implemented on the Atmel MCU was coded
in C by John Doty of Noqsi Aersopace.
Actel FPGA
Logic designs on an Actel ProASIC3 A3P600-FGG256 Flash-based FPGA mounted
on the driver board provides the functionality below:
• Clock Sequencer (control lines to Driver)
• ADC Control (timing from Sequencer)
• Pixel word formatter (Camera Link Subsystem)
• 3.3V CMOS to 2.5V Low Voltage Differential Signaling (LVDS) conversion
(Camera Link & Spare Control)
• LVDS Serializer
The clock sequencer on the Actel FPGA is the Trakimas-Larosa-Doty (TLD)
sequencer, developed by Engineers at the then MIT Center for Space Research (now
the Kavli Institute for Astrophysics and Space Research) in 2003 as a means to control
CCD detectors in development [55].
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A.4.3 Video Board
The video board houses the video measurement chains, along with op amps and mul-
tiplexers for temperature measurement and housekeeping voltage acquisition. Figure
A-10 is a picture of the top side of the video board.
Figure A-10: Bottom side of TESS prototype Detector Electronics video board with
video chain labeled
Video Chain
The video chains measure the analog signal output for each pixel from the CCD
output nodes and convert them into digital signals for storage and image processing.
There are 16 video chains on the video board, one for each node of four CCDs. The
video chains use the clamp/dual slope method of measuring the charge stored in each
pixel of a CCD.
Clamp/Dual Slope Sampling The clamp/dual slope sampling method com-
bines the advantages of the clamp sampling and dual slope sampling methods, as
shown in Figure A-11. Its advantages include good bandwidth/phase control, opti-
mum rejection of white noise, near optimum rejection of flicker noise, excellent iso-
lation between pixels as they are read out, immunity to DC drift, rejection of flicker
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noise, absence of a critical integrate/deintegrate balance requirement, and sufficient
processing speed. The clamp/dual slope sampling method has flight heritage on ACIS
on Chandra, SXC on HETE-2, the star trackers on HETE-2, and XIS on Suzaku.
Figure A-11: Clamp/dual slope sampling method
Figure A-12 is a simplified schematic of each video chain (highlighted with yellow
box and labeled in Figure A-10) that measures the charge of each pixel as it is output
from the output gate via the serial register. The Int, Hold, and Clamp signal shown in
Figure A-12 are the same measurement chain control signals appearing in the timing
diagram shown in Figure A-13.
Figure A-12: Simplified video chain schematic with clamp and dual slope measure-
ment components highlighted
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The ”pix” block in the LSE file example (shown in Section A.5) generates the
signals shown in Figure A-13 to clock out and measure the charge in one CCD pixel.
Additionally, the ”pix”, ”pixA”, and ”pixB” blocks are contiguous in memory, mean-
ing each time ”pix” is executed, ”pixA” and ”pixB” are also executed. Since each pix
block reads out and measures two pixels, the video chains readout a total of six pixels
per node when the Atmel MCU directs the Actel FPGA to execute the ”pix” block.
The 6-pixel readout timing block is necessary because the step execution is constant
within the Actel FPGA, and pixel readouts are 6 times faster than parallel transfer
rates. Charge is inefficiently transferred if the parallel transfer rate is too high.
Figure A-13: CCD readout and measurement chain control signal timing shown rel-
ative to 15 MHz periods specified in LSE code
A.4.4 Frame Readout Via Camera Link
The DE outputs pixels using Camera Link protocol. For REXIS testing, the Frame
Grabber custom hardware module implemented on the Virtex-5 FPGA receives the
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pixels according to the Camera Link standard and then rearranges the pixel order to
create a coherent image in SDRAM for later image processing.
Overclocks and Underclocks
During the course of a science run lasting some mission specific amount of time (from
1000 to 100,000 seconds on ACIS [39], for example), each pixel’s bias values vary with
slow changes in the DC level of the analog readout electronics. These variations are
compensated by ”overclocking” the CCD, i.e., reading pixels from the frame store
that never received charge from imaging pixels [77]. These ”overclock” or ”overscan”
pixels have no residual parallel clock artifacts. The average value of the overclock
pixels will directly measure the change in DC level, and can therefore be used to
correct it [77].
In the output of the DE to the frame grabber, the overclocks appear ”after” the
image pixels in each row of pixels read out, and the underclocks appear ”before” the
image pixels in each row. Figure A-14 shows this ordering. The number of overclocks
is configurable in the LSE code used to program the Atmel MCU–four overclock pixels
appear in Figure A-14.
Figure A-14: Relative position of underclock pixels, image pixels, and overclock pixels
in each row of DE frame readout
Frame Readout Timing
The following discussion of pixel readout format assumes a four CCID-41 array with
CCID-41 dimensions of 1024 horizontal pixels x 1024 vertical pixels, 256 horizontal
pixels per row, 4 underclock pixels per row, and 4 overclock pixels per row. Pixel
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readout over the Camera Link Interface is based on pixel clusters of 16 pixels each,
with each pixel being from one of the 16 nodes in the four CCD detector array. As
shown in Figure A-15, the FPGA hardware reads in the measured value on a single
pixel from each node in the four CCD detector array and places all 16 measured pixel
values into a single pixel cluster for transmission via the Camera Link protocol.
Figure A-15: Visualization of construction of a single pixel cluster of 16 pixel values
The transmit time duration of a single pixel cluster is 1.6 µs. Since each row in
each CCD node is effectively 264 horizontal pixels wide (4 underclock ”pixels” + 256
image pixels + 4 overclock ”pixels”), and each pixel cluster contains one pixel from
each node, 264 pixel clusters are required to transfer an entire row from each node
(16 total rows). The time required to transfer an entire row is given in Equation A.3
256 pixel clusters ∗ 1.6 µs
pixel cluster
= 422.4 µs (A.3)
After all of the pixels in each of the serial registers are measured and read out, the
electronics transfer the next row of pixels from the frame store into the serial register,
which requires 9.6 µs (the LSE commands for the frame store to serial transfer appear
in the ”fr2serial” block in the LSE example in Section A.5). Thus the total time to
readout and transmit one row from each of the CCD nodes is 422.4 µs + 9.6 µs =
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The LSE command ”row1 : serials1 pix ld go 1 fr2serial ld go ” performs a mea-
surement and readout of pixel values in the serial register for one row of each CCD
node followed by a vertical transfer of pixels from the frame store to the serial regis-
ter. The LSE command ”serial read1 : parallels1 row1 iterate” iterates the ”row1”
command ”parallels1” times.
Table A.1: Execution timed for LSE blocks responsible for pixel readout and mea-
surement
LSE Block 66.6 ns steps Block execution time
interline 24 1.6 µs
fr2serial 144 9.6 µs
image2fr 121 8.066 µs
pix 48 3.2 µs
Readout Format
In Figure A-16, each node is labeled according to which CCD it belongs to in the
four CCD detector array. For example, nodes 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D are the four nodes
oc CCID #1 in the detector array. The horizontal arrows in Figure A-16 indicate
the serial register output order for each node, while the vertical arrows represent the
direction of row readouts as each row is transferred from the frame store to the serial
register. In Figure A-16 and Table A.2, the ”L” (i.e. ”L1”) stands for ”Last” to
indicate the last pixels in each node output during a frame readout.




1st 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
2nd 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Last L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 L10 L11 L12 L13 L14 L15 L16
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Figure A-16: Pixel cluster readout order, demonstrating bi-directional readout of each
pair of serial registers
Figure A-17 shows the sequence of pixel clusters transfers that make up each row
followed by the sequence of row transfers that make up a complete frame transfer
via the Camera Link interface. In the Camera Link format, FVAL high indicates a
pixel is valid within an image frame, LVAL high means a pixel is valid within a line
(referred to as rows in CCD parlance), and DVAL is clock to signal the receiving
device to accept a pixel value. The DVAL signal period is 66.6 ns, during which time
the Camera Link data bits representing the pixel value are kept constant while DVAL
change from high to low. [54]
A.4.5 Parallel Clocking
ASCA and ACIS employed parallel transfer rates of 20 - 100 kHz. Faster parallel
transfer rates improve the duty cycle and reduce the number of misplaced photons.
If no capacitor bank is present to store charge for parallel transfer, then the limiting
factor of parallel clocking speed is the capacity of the power supply to provide the
required current surge. The required current is calculated using Equation A.5 below:
I = C × V × A× f (A.5)
where C is a process dependent constant, V is the voltage swing of the parallel
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Figure A-17: Camera Link frame output order [54]
clock voltages, A is the total area of image and frame store regions of the CCD, and
f is the parallel clock frequency.
A.5 LSE File Example
File{
step2 : 2 steps
step3 : 3 steps
step4 : 4 steps
step5 : 5 steps
step7 : 7 steps
pix :block{
LVAL high FVAL high Int high CNV high step \# A0 start new conversion
RG high step \# 1
Clamp high step \# 2





P2-OR low RG low step \# 7
CNV low step \# 8
step \# 9 MSB shows up at ADC output
Clamp low Hold high step \# 10
P1-OR high step \# 11
step \# 12
step \# 13
step \# 14 Start integration
P3-OR low Hold low Int high step \# 15
step \# 16
Hold high step \# 17
step \# 18
P2-OR high step \# 19 Hold
step \# 20
step \# 21
Hold low step \# 22
P1-OR low step \# 23
CNV high step \# 24 start new conversion
RG high step \# 25
Clamp high step \# 26




P2-OR low RG low step \# 31
CNV low step \# 32
step \# 33 MSB shows up at ADC output
Clamp low Hold high step \# 34
P1-OR high step \# 35
step \# 36
step \# 37
step \# 38 Start integration
P3-OR low Hold low Int high step \# 39
step \# 40
Hold high step \# 41
step \# 42
P2-OR high step \# 43 Hold
step \# 44
step \# 45
Hold low step \# 46
P1-OR low step \# 47
}block
pixA :block{
LVAL high FVAL high Int high CNV high step \# A0 start new conversion
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RG high step \# 1
Clamp high step \# 2




P2-OR low RG low step \# 7
CNV low step \# 8
step \# 9 MSB shows up at ADC output
Clamp low Hold high step \# 10
P1-OR high step \# 11
step \# 12
step \# 13
step \# 14 Start integration
P3-OR low Hold low Int high step \# 15
step \# 16
Hold high step \# 17
step \# 18
P2-OR high step \# 19 Hold
step \# 20
step \# 21
Hold low step \# 22
P1-OR low step \# 23
CNV high step \# 24 start new conversion
RG high step \# 25
Clamp high step \# 26




P2-OR low RG low step \# 31
CNV low step \# 32
step \# 33 MSB shows up at ADC output
Clamp low Hold high step \# 34
P1-OR high step \# 35
step \# 36
step \# 37
step \# 38 Start integration
P3-OR low Hold low Int high step \# 39
step \# 40
Hold high step \# 41
step \# 42




Hold low step \# 46
P1-OR low step \# 47
}block
pixB :block{
LVAL high FVAL high Int high CNV high step \# A0 start new conversion
RG high step \# 1
Clamp high step \# 2




P2-OR low RG low step \# 7
CNV low step \# 8
step \# 9 MSB shows up at ADC output
Clamp low Hold high step \# 10
P1-OR high step \# 11
step \# 12
step \# 13
step \# 14 Start integration
P3-OR low Hold low Int high step \# 15
step \# 16
Hold high step \# 17
step \# 18
P2-OR high step \# 19 Hold
step \# 20
step \# 21
Hold low step \# 22
P1-OR low step \# 23
CNV high step \# 24 start new conversion
RG high step \# 25
Clamp high step \# 26




P2-OR low RG low step \# 31
CNV low step \# 32
step \# 33 MSB shows up at ADC output
Clamp low Hold high step \# 34
P1-OR high step \# 35
step \# 36
step \# 37
step \# 38 Start integration
P3-OR low Hold low Int high step \# 39
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step \# 40
Hold high step \# 41
step \# 42
P2-OR high step \# 43 Hold
step \# 44
step \# 45
Hold low step \# 46
P1-OR low step \# 47
}block
# transfer one row into the serial register
fr2serial :block{
LVAL low FVAL high P1-IA low P1-FS low step2 \# 0
Clamp high step \# 2
Int low step7 \# 3
Clamp low Hold high step5 \# 10
Int high Hold low step2 \# 15
Hold high step \# 17
P1-OR high step4 \# 18
Hold low step2 \# 22
P3-IA high P3-FS high step2 \# 24
Clamp high step \# 26
Int low step7 \# 27
Clamp low Hold high step5 \# 34
Int high Hold low step2 \# 39
Hold high step5 \# 41
Hold low step2 \# 46
P2-IA low P2-FS low step2 \# 48
Clamp high step \# 50
Int low step7 \# 51
Clamp low Hold high step5 \# 58
Int high Hold low step2 \# 63
Hold high step5 \# 65
Hold low step2 \# 70
P1-IA high P1-FS high step2 \# 72
Clamp high step \# 74
Int low step7 \# 75
Clamp low Hold high step5 \# 82
Int high Hold low step2 \# 87
Hold high step5 \# 89
Hold low step2 \# 94
P3-IA low P3-FS low step2 \# 96
Clamp high step \# 98
Int low step3 \# 99
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P1-OR low step4 \# 102
Clamp low Hold high step5 \# 106
Int high Hold low step2 \# 111
Hold high step5 \# 113
Hold low step2 \# 118
P2-IA high P2-FS high step2
Clamp high step \# 122
Int low step7 \# 123
Clamp low Hold high step5 \# 130
Int high Hold low step2 \# 135
Hold high step5 \# 140
Hold low step2 \# 142
}block
# fast transfer from image section to frame store
interline :block{








CNV low Clamp high step \# 8
step \# 9
step \# 10















FVAL low LVAL low CNV high P1-IA low P1-FS low P1-OR low RG high pstep \# 0
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P3-IA high P3-FS high P3-OR high pstep \# 24
CNV low P2-IA low P2-FS low P2-OR low pstep \# 48
P1-IA high P1-FS high P1-OR high pstep \# 72
P3-IA low P3-FS low P3-OR low pstep \# 96
P2-IA high P2-FS high P2-OR high pstep \# 120
}block
# readout pixels from all four nodes "ffff"
2 \ ffff writeSeq
44 serials1 :constant
1024 parallels1 :constant
frame_delay1 : 100000 usec iterate
row1 : serials1 pix ld_go 1 fr2serial ld_go
serial_read1 : parallels1 row1 iterate
raster1 : frame_delay1 parallels1 image2fr ld_go serial_read1 frame_delay
run1 : raster1 iterate
g1 : 1 run1





Solar X-ray Monitor Design
This appendix details the REXIS Solar X-ray Monitor (SXM) design. It begins with
a brief background on the science motivation for the SXM in the REXIS system
and estimates of the solar x-ray flux the SXM will be required to measure during
the mission. Next, the design of each of the major electronics circuits constituting
the SXM is presented. The schematics presented in this appendix correspond to the
REXIS SXM Engineering Test Unit (ETU) design, which is separate from the REXIS
SXM electronics design on the MEB appearing in Appendix C, although the SXM
electronics on the MEB are closely based on the SXM ETU design. This appendix
closes with test results for the REXIS SXM ETU PCB.
B.1 Overview
The REXIS SXM ETU design consists of an Amptek Silicon Drift Diode (SDD) with
built-in thermoelectric cooler (TEC), a preamplifier, supporting measurement and
control electronics, and an FPGA interface. Figure B-1 shows a diagram with each
of these primary component groups labeled in the REXIS Engineering and Flight
Model configuration. In the SXM ETU, measurement and control electronics sit on
the SXM ETU PCB with a connector to the Virtex-5 ML507 development board for
the FPGA interface, and the SDD/TEC and preamplifier sit on a separate PCB with
two separate connectors to the SXM ETU PCB. In the REXIS Engineering and Flight
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Models, the measurement and control electronics sit on the REXIS MEB along with
the Virtex-5 FPGA, while the SDD/TEC package and preamplifier, shown in Figure
B-2, sits on a different face of the OSIRIS-REx spacecraft than the main REXIS
instrument. In Figure B-2, the MDM9 connector (labeled “AXON”) provides power
and interface control signals, while the SMA connector carries the analog output of
the preamplifier to the measurement electronics on the MEB.
Figure B-1: Solar X-ray Monitor functional block diagram
Figure B-2: CAD rendering of REXIS SDD/TEC and preamplifier inside aluminum
housing
B.1.1 Science Motivation
REXIS maps the asteroid Bennu (formerly 1999 RQ36) by using the Sun as an X-
ray source to illuminate Bennu, which absorbs these X-rays and fluoresces its own
X-rays based on the chemical composition of the asteroid surface. However, solely
pointing the REXIS CCD detectors at the asteroid and identifying, for example, a
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very bright or very dim section on the surface map could lead project scientists to
incorrectly interpret the data; these sections result from a compositional change in
the asteroid regolith or from solar variability providing more or less-than-expected
illumination of the asteroid. To provide context for the data collected with the CCD
detectors, REXIS will support the SXM to measure the x-ray spectrum of the Sun
during REXIS operation. [46]
The SXM measurements allow for decoupling of solar activity from the collected
CCD data and faciltate production of maps of RQ36 that are independent of the
number of X-rays incident on the asteroid. Some of the solar x-rays also will reflect
off the asteroid into REXIS CCDs and imprint the solar spectrum onto the CCD
data. This imprinting will appear as systematic noise scientists can subtract out with
knowledge of the Sun’s activity at the time REXIS measured the CCD data. The
SXM also provides solar variability data of general scientific interest and of interest
to other teams on the OSIRIS-REx project. While data from the Geostationary
Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES) or ground measurements of the Sun’s
activity taken on Earth could be used for any of the project’s needs, including a
spectrometer on the OSIRIS-REx satellite itself allows for accurate measurements of
solar spectra at the asteroid location. As an added bonus, scientists could use REXIS
SXM data to verify models of the Sun’s radiation at distances between the orbits of
Earth and Mars. [46]
Given the desired energy measurement range of the SXM is approximately 10
keV, which corresponds closely to the sensitive range of the REXIS CCD detectors,
and the required SXM resolution is 0.03125 keV, 320 energy bins are required to
produce a histogram of solar x-rays incident on the SXM. Figure B-3 is a plot of
estimated photon count vs. energy the Sun will produce during REXIS operation.
The curves represent the current best estimate of quantum efficiency for 26 days
of accumulation. The vertical orange dashed lines indicate spectral lines for Iron,
Magnesium, Aluminum, Silicon, and Sulfur, and the Oxygen spectral line is not
shown.
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Figure B-3: Solar spectral model simulated histogram using chrondrite spectrum and
experimental data
B.1.2 NICER Heritage
The REXIS SXM design draws on heritage from the detector system design of the
Neutron Star Interior Composition Explorer (NICER) program. NICER is a NASA
Explorer Mission of Opportunity designed to study the gravitational, electromagnetic,
and nuclear-physics of neutron stars [41]. The NICER design consists of 56 Amptek
SDDs along with signal shaping and processing circuitry [71]. By studying the timing
and spectroscopic properties of X-ray millisecond pulsars, NICER will allow scientists
to infer the masses and radii of neutron stars [71]. At the time of this writing, NASA
had selected NICER for launch to the ISS in December of 2016 with a planned mission
life of 18 months.
The primary difference between the NICER Measurement/Power unit (MPU)[56]
electronics design (which forms the basis for the REXIS SXM electronics design) is
NICER’s requirement to measure both the energy and arrival time of each x-ray pho-
ton striking the Amptek SDD. REXIS science calibration requires only measurement
of the energy of each x-ray photon incident on the SDD.
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B.2 SDD and Preamplifier
The REXIS SDD is the Amptek XR100SDD, a 25 mm2 detector with a thin alu-
minized entrance window for good low energy response. Each detector is mounted on
a thermoelectic cooler, which maintains the detector at approximately negative 60◦
Celsius while the package is at room temperature. Figure B-4 shows the structure of
the Amptek SDD and TEC package.
Figure B-4: Amptek AXR SDD, showing Beryllium window on metal housing, Ther-
moelectric Cooler, and pins for electrical interface on mounting [20]
The SDD silicon structure includes a classic series of p+ rings on a high resis-
tivity n-type substrate. Applying higher voltages to the more remote rings creates
a potential gradient in the radial direction, guiding signal electrons to a very small,
low capacitance anode in the center. The detector anode is connected to the input
of charge sensitive amplifier which converts signal electrons generated by an X-ray
photon into a voltage step [71], as shown in Figure B-5. The voltage step is pro-
portional to the energy deposited by a photon incident on the SDD. As opposed to
conventional photodiodes, which use two planar contacts for cathode and anode, the
SDD uses a single small anode. The anode’s small area significantly decreases the
input capacitance, which decreases the overall noise in the detector’s measurements
[8].
B.2.1 Preamplifier Circuit
The preamplifier amplifies the voltage output of the SDD/TEC packages’s internal
JFET. The JFET on the SDD/TEC package collects the signal current generated by
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Figure B-5: Amptek SDD operation and signal processing flow [8]
an x-ray strike on the SDD.
B.3 Measurement Electronics
To measure the energy of each photon incident on the SDD, the SXM design combines
a shaper circuit, trigger circuit, and amplitude capture circuit to form a measurement
chain. The measurement chain feeds an ADC to convert the analog voltage represen-
tative of an x-ray event into a digital value for histogram binning.
B.3.1 Shaper Circuit
The shaper circuit (Figure B-6) shapes the analog signal output of the preamplifier
to facilitate measurement of the peak energy of an x-ray incident on the SDD, as
well as removing high frequency noise generated by the preamplifier. Passing the
preamplifier output through a low pass filter smooths out the noise and produces a
step–the step’s rate of rise is proportional to the charge pulse generated by a photon
on the SDD. Differentiating the step produces a pulse with height proportional to
the charge. Differentiating a second time produces a signal crossing zero at the time
the charge pulse occurs on the SDD, delayed by the filter group delay, other amplifier
delay, and cable delays. [56]
168
Figure B-6: Schematic of SXM ETU shaper circuit
B.3.2 Trigger Circuit
The trigger circuit detects when the preamplifier output is above the event threshold
(configurable in software), which corresponds to an X-ray strike on the SDD. It also
detects the moment of maximum energy when FSW should sample the shaper first
derivative output (outu) read by the ADC, based on the second derivative output
(outb) of the shaper circuit. FSW then stores the ADC digital output value in the
appropriate histogram bin.
Figure B-7: Schematic of SXM ETU trigger circuit
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As shown in Figure B-7 two S/R latches along with the internal latch in the U19
comparator form a state machine to detect threshold crossing and peak energy. In
the normal inactive state, Trig and Wait are inactive (low), and TRIG and HOLD
are also inactive (high). When the second derivative from the shaper (outb) exceeds
the low level threshold (slow thresh), lldn goes low and forces Trig high. When
Trig goes high, the latch feature of U19 is disabled. Next, when U7 asserts zp, which
normally occurs within a few nanoseconds since the outb signal should be above vb, ,
Wait goes high and arms the zero crossing detection. When outb crosses vb (analogous
to crossing zero), U7 asserts the zm signal, which asserts HOLD (low) and reenables
the latch function of U7. [56] When the trigger circuit asserts HOLD, FSW should
read the voltage on the ADC inputs and store it in the appropriate energy bin.
When FSW asserts the RESET signal (low), both TRIG and HOLD deassert
(both high). If lldn is high (meaning no pulse is in progress), asserting RESET
fully resets the state machine to the inactive state. If lldn is high when FSW asserts
RESET (meaning a pulse is in progress), then the state machine will immediately
assert TRIG and arm the zero crossing detection. This design ensures the trigger
logic can cleanly capture a photon pulse that begins before RESET deasserts, so
long as the pulse is above the low level threshold (slow thresh) when FSW deasserts
RESET . [56]
Based on the possibility of erroneous states, FSW should assert RESET if the
trigger circuit asserts HOLD without first asserting TRIGGER. FSW should also
assert RESET after changing the low level threshold (slow thresh).
B.3.3 Amplitude Capture
The amplitude capture circuit stores the voltage corresponding to the maximum en-
ergy for an X-ray event across a capacitor. The voltage is stored when the trigger
module asserts the Hold signal. As shown in the amplitude capture module circuit
schematic in Figure B-8, R2 delays the charging of C2 slightly to compensate for
delays in the HOLD signal. Zero amplitude corresponds to the vb voltage value (ap-
proximately 1.2V). Employing a balanced differential configuration with the PH+
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and PH− signals cancels charge injection from the switch and output drift due to
op amp bias current. The outputs of the amplitude capture circuit PH+ and PH−
feed the differential inputs of the AD7984 ADC used to digitize the outu signal from
the shaper representing the photon energy. [56]
Figure B-8: Schematic of SXM ETU amplitude capture circuit
B.4 Control Electronics
B.4.1 Threshold Control
Dual diode D13 serves as a quiet, approximately 1.2V, bias voltage source (vb), while
op amp U18A translates the V LLD ground-referenced input from the DAC to input
levels relative to the 1.2V bias, vb [56], as shown in Figure B-9.
B.4.2 TEC Driver
The REXIS FSW and controlling electronics must control the voltage across the
inputs of the TEC on the Amptek SDD module in order to maintain a sufficiently
cold SDD temperature for effective operation. The TEC driver is a buck switching
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Figure B-9: Schematic of SXM ETU threshold control circuit
power converter implementing Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) of the input voltage
from the spacecraft.
Figure B-10: Schematic of SXM ETU TEC driver circuit
If the switch current exceeds ≈ 0.25A, Q6 turns on and causes the U14 NAND
gate to turn off the PWM drive to the MOSFET. PWM pulse widths should be
substantially shorter than 1µs and much longer than the 25ns switching time of the
MOSFET driver U15. [56]
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B.4.3 Cockcroft-Walton High Voltage Generator
The Cockcroft-Walton High Voltage Generator provides the negative high voltage (≈
-115 V) bias for the SDD. The input PWM from the FPGA (controlled by FSW) is
nominally 32 kHz. As shown in Figure B-11 double pole single throw (DPST) switch
U5 slices and dices the nominally 28V input to drive a six stage Cockcroft-Walton
voltage multiplier. The resistors around U5 prevent destructive current surges on
start-up and protect against SEL, while R25 and C25 reduce ripple of the raw input
supply voltage. High voltage transistors Q3 and Q4 form an amplifier with a gain
≈ R24/R15, which is ≈ 100. Feedback from the U4A op amp’s output through R21
regulates the output of the circuit, while U4B provides a significanlty attenuated and
inverted housekeeping voltage for flight software to monitor the Cockcroft-Walton’s
high voltage output. The Cockcroft-Walton circuit provides a regulated output volt-
age range from 0V to -127V. [56]
Figure B-11: Schematic of SXM ETU cockcroft walton high voltage generator circuit
Although the SXM ETU was designed to receive a regulated 28V input similar
to the NICER MPU design, the SXM electronics design on the REXIS MEB was
designed to receive the unregulated spacecraft input voltage from the OSIRIS-REx
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interface. This input voltage can range between 26 and 34 VDC, which requires
REXIS FSW to actively monitor the high voltage output via the HVK signal.
B.4.4 SDD Temperature Interface
The Amptek SDD contains a silicon diode to serve as a temperature sensor, thus
providing feedback to FSW for controlling the TEC driver PWM. Forward voltage of
the SDD diode is typically 600 mV at 25◦ Celsius and low current, changing ≈ -2mV
/ K. The U16A and U16B op amps serve as a 100 mA current source to the diode.
The U17A op amp buffers and amplifies the diode voltage. Over an input range of
0.45V to 0.9V, U34A will output 0V to 3V, which nominally corresponds to 375K to
150K. [56]
Figure B-12: Schematic of SXM ETU SDD temperature interface circuit
B.5 FPGA Interface
For the REXIS SXM system on the REXIS EM, the custom hardware module on the
Virtex-5 FPGA will provide 320 energy bins of 32 bits each in order to record the
number of events detected in each energy bin during the histogram update period
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(integration time of the SXM). The histogram update period is configurable by FSW
command, with the baseline value set to 100 seconds.
Each time the measurement chain detects an event above the low level threshold,
the custom hardware module commands the ADC to read the voltage on its inputs,
records the ADC’s digital output, and increments the 32-bit count of the histogram
bin into which the measured voltage (corresponding to photon energy) falls.
B.6 SXM Electronics Testing
This section documents lab bench testing of the REXIS SXM ETU PCB. At the time
of this writing, test of the SXM ETU PCB with external SDD/TEC and preamplifier
under Iron-55 irradiation had not yet taken place.
B.6.1 Shaper
Figure B-13: SXM waveforms captured on oscilloscope during testing
Figure B-13 shows the first derivative (outu) signal labeled as ”1st derivative”
and second derivative (outb) signal labeled as ”2nd derivative” from the shaper circuit
following a step-like input signal labeled ”Input.” The first derivative signal peaks with
the peak input voltage, and the second derivative crosses zero as the 1st derivative
peaks, demonstrating the correct waveforms for capture of the peak value of the input
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signal. The signal labeled ”Baseline” is vb signal, approximately 1.2V. Due to the
magnitude of the signal labeled ”Input,” some clipping is evident on the 1st derivative
signal. The input voltage used in testing (approximately 2V) was significantly higher
than the voltages which x-ray photons of 10 keV in energy or less are expected to
produce.
Figure B-14 shows the HOLD signal asserting (low) correctly just after the zero
crossing of the second derivatives signal (outb) from the shaper circuit, with the delay
resulting from the switching time of comparators. At the moment HOLD asserts
(low), FSW should command a read of the ADC and bin the measured voltage output
of the ADC.
Figure B-14: SXM waveforms captured on oscilloscope during testing, showing asser-
tion of hold signal
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B.7 SXM ETU PCB





The following figures are the detailed schematic designs for the REXIS Engineering
Model Main Electronics Board, the design of which appears in Chapter 4.
C.1 Engineering Model MEB Schematics
Figure C-1: Spacecraft communications interfaces: optocoupler, RS422 transceivers
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Figure C-2: Analog-Digital Converter with internal 8:1 multiplexer
Figure C-3: External connectors to SDD/TEC and preamplifier, PRTs, and Frangi-
bolt limit switch
Figure C-4: Frangibolt radiation cover release mechanism actuation circuit, featuring
the MSK5055RH switching regulator controller
180
Figure C-5: Housekeeping voltage generation and multiplexing
Figure C-6: Aeroflex 64Mbit NOR Flash for configuration bistream storage
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Figure C-7: EMI filter and primary DC/DC regulators
Figure C-8: 1.0V DC/DC Converter
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Figure C-9: 2.5V DC/DC Converter
Figure C-10: 3.3V DC/DC Converter and -5V DC Regulator
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Figure C-11: 3D-Plus SDRAM Module
Figure C-12: MOSFET switch used to control power to DE and SXM
184
Figure C-13: SXM DAC and ADC
Figure C-14: SXM cockcroft walton high voltage generator
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Figure C-15: SXM cockcroft walton high voltage generator
Figure C-16: SXM shaper
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Figure C-17: SXM TEC
Figure C-18: SXM SDD temp interface
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Figure C-19: SXM threshold control
Figure C-20: SXM trigger
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Figure C-21: Bank 0 of the Virtex-5FX130T
Figure C-22: Banks 1 and 2 of the Virtex-5FX130T
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Figure C-23: Banks 3 and 4 of the Virtex-5FX130T
Figure C-24: Banks 5 and 6 of the Virtex-5FX130T
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Figure C-25: Banks 7 and 8 of the Virtex-5FX130T
Figure C-26: Banks 11 and 12 of the Virtex-5FX130T
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Figure C-27: Banks 13 and 15 of the Virtex-5FX130T
Figure C-28: Banks 19 and 20 of the Virtex-5FX130T
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Figure C-29: Banks 21, 23, and 24 of the Virtex-5FX130T
Figure C-30: Banks 25 and 26 of the Virtex-5FX130T
193
Figure C-31: Banks 27 and 29 of the Virtex-5FX130T
(a) (b)
Figure C-32: MGT pins of Virtex-5FX130T
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(a) (b)
Figure C-33: No connect pins of Virtex-5FX130T
(a) (b) (c)
Figure C-34: VCC pins of Virtex-5FX130T
195
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure C-35: Ground pins of Virtex-5FX130T
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